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MR. JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON, CREATIVE
DISSENTER

A. J. Levin*

I
OUTLINES OF CAREER

U

NTIL the ad~ent of Justice ~liver~endell Holmes, the mas~er_ful
and magnetic figure of Chief-- Justice John Marshall well-nigh
overshadowed the whole field of constitutional jurisprudence. That
Marshall made inestimable additions to our ideas of cooperative living
at the very beginning of our democracy, and that his repu,te was well
deserved, cannot be gainsaid. But one has good cause to wonder why
the name of so distinguished a colleague as William Johnson, who sat
on the same bench with Marshal). for almost thirty years during that
formative period, should have been almost completely obscured all
these years. Rare, indeed, is the jurist or lawyer who h~s heard of
him, yet he was a man who was outstanding in his day for-disagreeing
with Marshall on his most important pronouncements an<il,1 at times,
exceeding Marshall in his Federalist views.

A. The Forgotten Man
If the rational study of law--as Holmes one time remarked-is
still to a large extent the study of history,1 here is.room for historical
study. But more than the study of history is needed before we even can
begin to -unravel the tangles of human behavior which appear to us in
the prearranged form we call "history." The de~p and underlying
reasons why the effort of one person is elevated and that of another· is
passed by is something which history alone--as we kn()W it-does not
explain. Here we approach the lives of two truly unusual minds and
at the very outset run into contrarieties in the solution of which such
concepts as partisanship and place of' birth shed but very little effective
light. We soon find that nothing short of an attempt ait a dynamic
analysis of the processes of human thinking and action will_ suffice to
draw significant conclusions from the fact that Johnson, a j efferso:nian

*

Member of (Detroit) Michigan bar. A.B., J.D., University of M~chigan; author,
"Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Unenviable Dilemma," 42 l'v,11cH. L. REv.
803. (1944) and other articles in this and other legal periodicals.-Ed.
1
"The Path of the Law," CoLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 at 186 (1920); also
Plucknett, "Holmes: The Historian," 44 HARV. L. REv. 712 at 715 (1931).
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Republican, a southern democrat and a believer· in the "sovereignty"
of the states, should have been one of the strongest protagonists of the
Constitution in all our history and should have stood with the north
against Nullification.
Though Johnson assuredly did not overlook the "sovereign" rights
of the individual states, after two decades of experience as a justice he
spoke of the Constitution of the United States with superlative praise.
"In the Constitution of the United States," he declared in 1823 with
some considerable degree of emotion, "tlie most wonderful instrument
ever drawn by the hand of man, there is· a comprehension and precision that is unparalleled; and I can truly say, that after spending my
life in studying it, I still daily find in it some new excellence." 2 Nor was
this attitude one only for the occasion; for, we find him but a few years
later referring to the Constitution as "that instrument which was to
become the great safeguard of public justice and public morals." ii
2

From his circuit court opinion in Elkinson v. Deliesseline, August 7, l 823, 8
Fed. Cas. No. 4366, p. 492 at 495.
Edward S. Corwin, quoting this passage in CouRT OVER CoNSTITUTION 228
(1938) felt that the "spontaneous reverence" for the Constitution which is displayed
in this passage "strikes us today as somewhat 'quaint'." But Dean Roscoe Pound has
suggested historical and dynamic reasons for this enthusiasm. "A time of confident
political enthusiasm is propitious for entering upon projects of research in the operations
and problems and ends of the legal order. The present moment is not the first time in
which we have been confident tliat we were entering upon a new era of political and
legal perfection and that in a twinkling of an eye we should all be changed. The great
seal of the United States, as originally adopted, bore the device novus ordo saecloruima new order of the ages. The political literature of the rise of Jeffersonian democracy
is full of glowing prophecies of a new politics and a new law, governed by reason and in
accord with a rationalist morals. If these anticipations were not realized, nevertheless we
must not forget that because the men of that age believed they could do great things
they were able to do ·great things-not the least of them the framing of the Constitution of the United States and the reshaping of the received English law of the seventeenth century and making of it a law for the new world in the nineteenth century."
From address, "Law and Laws in the Twentieth Century," found in DEDICATORY
EXERCISES.OF TiiE LAW QuADRANGLE 25 at 46 (University of Michigan, June 15,
1934).
3
Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 at 280 (1827). Bertrand Russell,
a modern thinker not 'often inclined to overstatement, has recently said of the Constitution: "There is, however, no reason why all organizations should be mortal. The American Constitution, for example, does not invest any man or body of men with the kind or
reverence that leads to ignorance and impotence, nor does it readily lend itself, except to
some extent in relation to the Supreme Court, to the accumulation of habits and
maxims which prevent adaption to new circumstances. There is no obvious reason why
an organization of this sort should not persist indefinitely. I think, therefore, that
while most organizations perish sooner or later, either from rigidity or from external

1944}

JUSTICE JOHNSON, DISSENTER

499

Jurisprudence-not unlike other sciences-has become so departmentalized that it has shut out the consideration of many of the most
vital factors which have in reality contributed to what we term a
"legal" result. Thus, we are presented with the spectacle of the
dynamic expressions of a profound thinker in our history and the latent
forces represented by them literally brushed aside or repressed. Johnson is truly a "forgotten man" but centuries of neglect should warn
us that the forgotten man is not the economic but rather the psychological man. In all matters man strives and learns by scientific advances,
but even a Justice Holmes depressively considers his mind as a cul-desac ending in despair. It is safe to suggest that there is more to be
achieved in the future than is involved in the study of precedents and
the mechanics for expanding the Constitution when we find a biologist,
Julian Huxley,4 inquiring into the nature of absofotes and certitudeswhich are other words for authority-with the newer glasses which
most jurists prefer not to wear. Only by intensifying our desire to
know these hitherto obscured processes may we arrive at some understanding of order in what Sheldon Amos once called "the anarchial
condition of the legal system." 5
"There is not a more common, or more abundant source of error,"
Johnson once said !n an oration commemorating American Indepencauses, there is no inherent reason which makes this unavoidable." From PowER: A
NEW Soc1AL ANALYSIS 177 (1938).
Sir Henry Maine, who was very critical of popular government, nevertheless,
made an exception in the case of the Constitution of the United States.
Gladstone seems to have been quite as hyperbolic as Johnson when he wrote:
"As the British Constitution is the most subtle organism which has proceeded
from .•• progressive history, so the American Constitution is ... the most wonderful
work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man." Quoted by
William B. Cudlip in "Function of the States," 43 M1cH. L. REv. 95 at 97 (1944).
4
Huxley, "The Biologist Looks at Man," 26 FoRTUNE MAGAZINE 139 (December 1942). See also George Soule's recent work, THE STRENGTH OF NATIONS (1942).
Branislow Malinaweki, the eminent anthropologist, has complained that of all
branches of anthropology, primitive jurisprudence has received in rec~nt times the
scantiest and the least satisfactory treatment. CRIME AND CuSTOM IN SAVAGE SocIETY
3 (1932). It has very recently been said that "until recent years, it is only the social
anthropologist who has been able to escape from this compartmentalization of human
relations. Beginning with studies of primitive tribes· that, in some cases, did not even
have special economic and political organizations, apart from their kinship systems, it
was impossible for him to work with such categories." William Foote Whyte, "Can the
Social Sciences Be Useful," 13 AM. ScHoLAR 346 at 349 (1944). This stimulating
article unfortunately omits to discuss the technique of mental processes leading to social
results. This is a common omission.
5
AMos, THE ScIENCE OF LAw 362 (1874).

..
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dence, "than that which arises from the humility of the pretensions of
the present, to emulate the actions of the times that are past. Man,
with the same principles, the same motives, the same means, and the
same education, is ever capable of the same e:fforts when roused into
action." 6 With the appointment of Justice.Holmes, attitudes declared
a century before by Justice Johnson concerning the judicial function
under our constitutional system again came to light in Holmes's now
famous dissents. Holmes began a judicial re-examination which harked
back to the earlier dissents of Johnson, but it should be said that there
is no basis for iuferring that the thinking of Holmes was not the expression of his own creative personality. Nevertheless, during the
period when the Holmes dissents were becoming the dominant view
of the Supreme Court, Johnson's name rarely appeared in the published
opinions of the Supreme Court or in legal literature or biography.7
But not only has Johnson's work been virtually forgotten and his
memory almost obliterated but most of those few who have spoken of
him and of his contributions have dealt only sparingly V{ith the dynamic
quality of his thinking. Thus, wh~n compared to Marshall, he is spoken
6
Oration delivered at St. Phillip's Church, Charleston. This oration, delivered
July 4, 1812, was printed in Charleston in 1813 in pamphlet form and is available in
the Charleston Public Library.
7 A few exceptions are here noted-further references appear later in this article.
Of Johnson's statement on due process in Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat.
(17 U.S.) 235 at 244 (1819), Justice Cooley, in his CoNSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS,
· 7th ed., 5b5 (1903) said: "We have met in no judicial decision a statement that embodies more tersely and accurately a more correct view of the principle we are considering." The statement was quoted in Daughtery v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 371 at 381,
140 N.W. 615 (1913).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter recently referred to Johnson as "one of the ablest of the
early members _of the Supreme Court." "Summation of the Conference," 24 A.B.A.J.
282 at 286 (1938). In one of his opinions he characterized Johnson as "one of the
most trenchant minds on the Marshall court." Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466
at 489, 59 S. Ct. 595 (1939).
1
Even Albert J. Beveridge, who was quite partisan to Marshall, spoke of Johnson's
opinion in Gibbons '!'· Ogden as "one of the best statements ever made, before or since,
of the regulation of commerce as the moving purpose that brought about the American
Constitution." 4 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 443 (1916).
Joi!_N M. DILLON, JoHN MARSHALL'S CoMPLETE CoNSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
(1903) has no discussion of Johnson's opip.ions except for a few bare references.
Professor Hale has called attention to the fact that Chief Justice Hughes adopted
Johnson's approach in Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S.
Ct. 231 (1934) wherein he said that the development recognized in that case was "a
development forec.!$t by the prophetic words of Justice Johnson in Ogden v. Saunders"
(p. 444). See Hale, "The Contract Clause: Ill," 57 HARV. L. REV. 852 at 882 et
seq. (1944). In a subsequent article the writer will try to show that Johnson would
have approached the question differently even though the result might have been the
same.
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of as "a man of no little personal vanity," who "affected a greater independence, for which he was on one occasion warmly congratulated by
Jefferson." 8 Albert J. Beveridge has characterized him more favorably, accepting the description of Johnson's contemporary, Charles
Jared Ingersoll, who said Johnson was as determined as Marshall was
and "strongly imbued with the principles of southern democracy, bold,
independent, eccentric and sometimes harsh." 9
Beveridge out of fairness said, however, that it turned out "that
tlie first man appointed for the purpose of thwarting Marshall's Nationalism, expressed,. twenty years after his appointment, stronger Nationalist sentiments than Marshall himself was, as yet, willing to avow
openly." Still, he hesitated to credit Johnson with his own views, for in
his eyes "Johnson's astonishing opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden is conclusive proof of the mastery the Chief Justice had acquired over his
Republic associate, or else of the conquest by Nationalism of the mind
of the South Carolina Republican." 10
K. C. Babcock, writing at the beginning of this century, concluded
that Johnson's views on implied powers "used even stronger terms
than Marshall had done." 11 Johnson's statement in Anderson v.
Dunn,1 2 a part of his opinion for the whole court, ranks as one of the
earliest creative expressions in our jurisprudence, and is a worthy precursor of what was to find utterance many years later in the opinions of
Justice Holmes:
"· •. The idea is Utopian, that government can exist without
leaving the exercise of discretion somewhere. Public security
against the abuse of such discretion may rest on responsibili_ty, and
stated appeals to public approbation. Where all power is derived
from the people, and public functionaries, at short intervals, deposit it at the feet of the people, to be resumed again, only at their
will, individual fears may be alarmed by the monsters of imaginations, but individual liberty can be in little danger. No one is so
visionary as to dispute the assertion, that the sole end and aim of
all our institutions is the safety and happiness of the citizen. But
the relation between the action and the end, is not always so direct
and palpable as to strike"the eye of every observer. The science of
8

EDWARDS. CoRwIN, JoHN MARSHALL AND THE CoNSTITUTioN: A CHRONICLE
OF THE SUPREME CouRT IIS (1919). (Italics the writer's.)
9
4 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JoHN MARSHALL 60 (1916).
10 4 id. at 444-445.
11
BABCOCK, THE RISE OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY (13 Am. Nation Series) 297

(1906).
12 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 204 at 226 (1821). (Italics the writer's.)
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government is the most abstruse of all sciences; if, indeed; that can
be called a science, which has but few fixed principles, and practically consists in little more than the exercise of a sound discretion,
applied to the exigencies of the state as they arise. It is the science
of experiment." 13
Justice Robert H. Jackson, while attorney general, remarked of
the passage quoted, "It is worth remembering that the sentiments there
expressed were not those of a modern revolutionist in constitutional
law. They were the sentiments of Justice William Johnson of the Supreme Court, expressed in r82r. When we let ourselves be guided by
this tolerant and far-seeing view of the art of government, we are not
departing from the Constitution; we are returning to it." 14
At present Johnson's works mainly tell his life story. The other
historical facts about him must literally be dug up from oblivion. John
M. Shirley, one of the few writers on the history of our jurisprudence
who took the trouble to study Johnson's life, tells us that "Johnson's
papers, like those of Pinkney and Haines, have been scattered to the
four winds." 15
13

See the oft-quoted passage by Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 at 630, 40 S. Ct. 17 (1919):
"But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to· get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life
is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some
prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system
I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purpose of the law that an
immediate check is required to save the country." (Italics the writer's.)
14
Jackson, "Back to The 9onstitution," 25 A.B.A.J. 745 at 749 (1939).
Of this same passage and the portion immediately preceding it K. C. Babcock in
THE RISE OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY (13 Am. Nat. Series) 297 (1906), says: "At
the beginning of an era of internal improvements at federal expense, of protective tariffs,
with a great civil war and its consequent financial and monetary questions in the future,
such words as these are both prophetic and ominl:>us. From the high plane of such broad,
constructive, statesman-like interpretation it would be but a step into the morass of
demagogic loose construction." The writer does not quote this passage because he shares
these fears but because it is an estimate of Johnson's capacity as a constitutional lawyer.
The subject must be more fully treated than this article permits.
15
SHIRLEY, THE DARKMOUTH CoLLEGE CAUSES 266 (1879). This coincides
with the statement made by a southern historian in a letter to the writer that it is
a characteristic of southern families not to keep family papers, and this is particularly
true of South Carolina. It is hoped, however, that in time new material will be un-
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Burton J. Hendrick in his Bulwark of the Republic,1 6 discussing
the "dissenting judge" as an historical type in American jurisprudence
before the advent of Justice Holmes, recalled that Justice Peter V.
Daniel, who died in I 860, was "one of the most pertinacious dissentients," but Johnson is not mentioned in that connection. Andrew McLaughlin in his work, A Constitutional History of the United States,
does not refer to Johnson by name; nor does Michael Kraus in his
A History of American History mention Johnson or his Life of Major
General Nathaniel Greene, whereas he does refer to Marshall's Life of
Washington.
B. Ancestry
Johnson was born in Charleston, South Carolina, on December 27,
r 77 I. As a child he spent his formative years in a family with a long
record of struggle for liberty and independence. The antecedents of
dissent, restlessness and movement dated back to the English Revolution of r 660. That this historical background of his family must have
influenced him is apparent from the fact that Johnson later delved
into this period preceding the American Revolution in his historical
biography of Major General Nathaniel Greene, which he published in
r822 under the title of Sketches of The Life and Correspondence of
Nathaniel Greene. 17 The struggles of the Johnson family were brought
into living reality by the vigorous figure of his liberty-loving father,
William Johnson, the Charleston blacksmith,18 and were intensified in
focus by the events of the day. The young Johnson grew to admire
liberty and independence, physical strength, personal courage in the
face of obstacles, mental energy and above all candor, directness and
integrity of purpose.
According to John Rutledge, Johnson's father was of that small
covered. Very brief thumb-nail sketches of Johnson-other than those elsewhere
referred to--may be found in: APPLETON'S ENCYC. OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 453
(1887); LAMB'S BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE UNITED STATES 412 (1901); 30·
Fed. Cas. p. 1380.
16
HENDRICK, BuLWARK OF THE REPUBLIC 417 (1937). See also George R.
Farnum's interesting portrait of another famous· dissenter in "John Marshall Harlan:
Portrait of a Great Dissenter," 30 A.B.A.J. 576 (1944).
17 Published at Charleston in two quarto volumes, hereafter referred to as WILLIAM
JOHNSON.
18
1741-1818, 40 So. CAR. HIST. & GEN. MAG. at p. 211 (1941). (Index).
Justice Johnson's father must not be confused with another William Johnson of
Charleston, referred to by McCrady, who lectured on electricity and magnetism and
the new discoveries of Benjamin Franklin. EDWARD M. McCRADY, HISTORY OF SouTH
CAROLINA UNDER THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT, 1719-1776, pp. 493, 494 (1899); 34
So. CAR. HIST. & GEN. MAG. 61 (1933).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 43 ,

group of artisans and mechanics who first moved the ball of revolution
in Charleston. "He was an upright, influential and intelligent mechanic, a man of considerable inherited means," who had not long
since come into South Carolina from New Y ork.19 "Th_e people were
still rejoicing over the repeal 'of the Stamp Act, and the feeling of
loyalty was strong. There were a few bold spirits, however, led by
Christopher Gadsden and William Johnson, an intelligent artisan, who
w~re not entirely satisfied. The Declaratory Act meant more to them
than the repeal of The Stamp Act. Their fears were realized when
parliament passed a statute the next year for levying a duty on glass,
red lead, white lead, painter's colors, tea, and paper imported into the
province." 20 Yates Snowden 21 gives us a picture of some ,of the turbulent background in which the father of Justice Johnson, an active
instigator of new measures, lived. When Lord Charles Greville Montagu, with his lady arrived at Charleston from England to assume
control of the government of South Carolina, there was rejoicing, "a
reception by the militia, the lieutenant governor, the Council, the
Assembly and everybody else representative of the _authority of South
Carolina." All came out to greet the young lord and lady with but
two noteworthy exceptions:
". . . blunt, honest, energetic and able Christopher Gadsden,
with a -following of workmen, led by William Johnson the blacksmith, was in favor of uncompromising measures only. They
scented outright revolution in the near future; and why timidly
delay the inevitable: The declaration of rights made by the South
Carolina Assembly and the Congress of the nine colonies meant
more to them than the repeal of the Stamp Act. That was merely
an incident demonstrating the growing power of the people and its
menace to royal and foreign control of the people's interests.
"Johnson had come from New York, an intelligent honorable
artisan of means. On a day when these various propagandist meet• 19 McCRADY, HISTORY OF SouTH CAROLINA UNDER THE RoYAL'GovERNMENT,
1719-1776, p. 589 (1899). Edward McCrady, the eminent historian of the south, was
a grand-nephew of Justice Johnson and grandson of William Johnson. He speaks of his
grandfather as "the one who took so active a part in the early movements of the Revolution." McCRADY, HISTORY OF SouTH CAROLINA IN THE REvoLUTION, 1775-1780,
p. 487' (1901), where McCrady tells how Johnson encountered Major Andre without
knowing at the time who he was; also McCRAoY, THE HISTORY OF SouTH CAROLINA
IN THE REVOLUTION, 1780-1783, p. 56 (1902). See also:.1 HAMPTON L. CARSON,
THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 227 (1892).
20
WILLIAM R. SMITH, SouTH CAROLINA AS A RoYAL PROVINCE, 1719-1776,
p. 357 (1903).
21
t SNOWDEN, HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA 286 (1920).
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ings were under way Mr. Johnson gathered a few of his friends
under a big oak tree, in the center of a square in Hampstead,
bounded by Charlotte, Washington, Calhoun and Alexander
Streets, and which was then one of the suburbs of Charlestown.
They earnestly discussed the aggressions of the mother country
and, like other brave and honest men before and after their day,
brought up again the query-'If eventually, why not now.' In
after years, the shade in which this initial revolutionary meeting
was held covered the deliberations of so many other radical political gatherings and it was known as the 'Liberty Tree'." 22
William Johnson was "throughout all the events which led up to
the Revolution Gadsden's great supP.ort"; he served as a cannoneer in
the Charleston battery of artillery stationed at the center of the lines.
The British authorities selected him as "one of the most dangerous
and important of the rebels." After the surrender of Charleston in
1780 Christopher Gadsden, William Johnson and others; accordingly,
were put on prison ships or transported as rebels to St. Augustine. 28
Later the father for a number of years represented the City of Charleston in the General Assembly of the state until he was retired on
account of age. 24

C. lnfouence of Greene's Personality
Justice Johnson's decision to write a biography of Greene could not
have been only because Greene's notable campaigns were conducted in
South Carolina but also because he knew Greene to be a great and
good man and beloved by Washington, who, Johnson felt, was Greene's
model.25 There was condensed and reviewed in Greene's life much of
what Johnson, according to his views, considered vital and necessary
in the conduct of life. He confessed in the introduction that Greene was
22

A note on the Liberty Tree is found in 1 WILLIAM JoHNSON 206. Johnson,
with excessive modesty, does not refer to the part his father played in this episode.
There is a note also on the Liberty Tree and William Johnson by Jay Hubbell, entitled " 'On the Liberty Tree,' A Revolutionary Poem from South Carolina," in 41
So. CAR. H1sT. & GEN. MAG. l l 7 et seq. ( 1940).
28
2 JAMES B. O'NEALL, BENCH AND BAR IN SouTH CAROLINA 51 (1859),
hereafter referred to as O'Neall.
24
Another son of William Johnson was Joseph Johnson, who in 1851 published
the TRADITIONS AND REMINISCENCES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE SouTH.
Joseph was president from 1818 to 1823 of the Charleston (S.C.) Branch of the Bank
of the United States. Reverend John Johnson, son of Joseph Johnson, was a member
and ,,curator of the South Carolina Historical Society, and died in his 78th year on
April 7, 1907, having been rector of St. Phillips Church for 34 years. 8 So. CAR.
HIST. & GEN. MAG. 178-179 (1907).
25
2 WILLIAM JOHNSON 433-456.

.506

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

his hero. He chose a worthy subject. Jefferson said of Greene: "Greene
was truly a great man, he had not perhaps all the qualities which so
peculiarly rendered Gen'l Washington the fittest man on earth for
directing so great a contest under so great difficulties . . . But Greene ,
was second to no one in enterprise, in resource, in sound judgment,
promptitude of decision, and every other military talent." 26 The work
also has value because it contains part of. Johnson's projected work on
the History of Parties, which was never published and probably never
completed. 21
26
10 PAUL LEICESTER FoRD, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 222-223
(1899). Letter to Johnson dated October 22, 1822. Jefferson was commenting on
Johnson's Life of Greene.
Jared Sparks said of Greene:
"We have taken occasion in a previous number of this journal to express our
admiration of the talents and character of General Greene. He may justly be regarded
as the most extraordinary man in the army of the revolution. We would not be understood to assert that he was the greatest man, or that he rendered more important services
than any other individual; but when the circumstances of his early life and education
are taken into view, as, well as the disadvantages under which he entered the service,
we know of none, whose subsequent reputation and advancement can with more justice
be attributed exclusively to personal merit." From review of Johnson's Life of Greene
in 15 NoRTH AMERICAN REVIEW 416 (1822).
"JOHNSON, JUDGE-an able man: has written lately the LIFE OF GENERAL
GREENE, one of the revolutionary officers. Greene was another Washington; the only
man able to take his place, if he had fallen; or if he had been overthrown by the cabal,
in Congress. General Charles Lee was a better captain-the best, we believe, in the army
of the revolution; but he was too adventurous-too bold and peremptory-too dangerous
for the place of commander-in-chief." "American Writers," 17 BLACKWOOD's MAGAZINE 68 (1825).
27 Johnson wrote from Charleston to Thomas Jefferson under date of April II,

1823:

"The Encouragement you give me, and the Motives you suggest have induced me
to resolve to continue my History of Parties; but I will pursue it leisurely, and must
take the Liberty to trouble you witli occasional queries on the Subject. Whether it
shall ever see the light or not, shall depend upon the Question whether I have to my
own satisfaction and that of the few Friends to whom I may submit it, supported the
Position which I have acknowledged as 'my End and Aim'-that the distinguishing
Characteristic of the Republican Party was, to check the Intemperance of both Democrats and Federalists and administer the Government agreeably to the true Views of the
Constitution, eqully uninfluenced by the Pretensions of the States or the United States.
Pray give me an explicit Opinion on the Correctness of my general Proposition.
Sacrifices to be sure were necessary to fix the Democrats without whose Aid there was
no getting on, but they were mere Sacrifices, and ancillary to the great End. They
were the Means, not the End of our political Course." I So. CAR. HIST. &; GEN. MAG.
207 (1900).
.
James Madison writing from Montpellier to Thomas Jefferson on January I 5,
1823, also commented on this work. "I hope you will .find an occasion for correcting
the error of the Judge [Johnson], in supposing that I am at work on the same ground
as will be occupied by his historical view of parties, and for animating him to the com-
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D. Education and Start of Career
In r789 Johnson entered the College of New Jersey, later known
as Princeton University, where the principles of the Declaration of
Independence were carried forward by its president, the forceful
clergyman, Dr. John Witherspoon, who was one of its signers. He was
graduated in I 790 28 with highest honors which he divided with John
Taylor, another South Carolinian.29 In r8r8 his alma mater and Harvard College conferred upon him the honorary degree of Doctor of
Laws.80
Both Taylor and Johnson entered the law office of General Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney in Charleston 81 and in January of r793 a license
to practice law was issued to Johnson. This was the same Pinckney who
later became Minister to France and is known in history books for his
utterance of the defiant words, "Millions for defense but not a cent for
tribute." Although Pinckney had fought in the war of the Revolution,
had helped frame the Constitution of the United States, and aided in
its ratification by South Carolina, he was, nevertheless, a patrician in
action and sentiment and believed with Alexander Hamilton in the
pletion of what he has begun on that subject. Nothing less than full-length likenesses of
the two great parties which have figured in the national politics will sufficiently expose
the deceptive colours under which they have been painted." 3 LETrERS AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 293 (1865).
Madison again referred to the subject in a letter to Jefferson dated June 27, 1823.
"Johnson is much indebted to you for your remarks on the definition of Parties."
Id. at 325.
28
8 So. CAR. HIST. &: GEN MAG. 98 ( l 907).
29
2 O'NEALL 169 in sketch of John Taylor. Taylor later became prominent in
politics and public affairs. He was Congressman, United States Senator, Governor of
South Carolina, Trustee of South Carolina College and a Director of The Theological
Seminary.
80
There was no citation given at the conferring of the degree at Princeton. The
Harvard College degree was voted by the corporation on July 15, 1818 and conferred
at commencement on August 26, I 8 l 8. Clifford K. Shipton, Custodian of the Harvard
University Archives, has furnished the writer the following information in a private
letter dated October 4, l 94 3 :
"It was not, at this time, customary to have ceremony like the modern one for the
granting of an honorary degree; in fact the recipient was hardly expected to be present.
Our records do not show whether or not Mr. Johnson was in Cambridge at that time.
"In that period it was not the custom to give diplomas unless the degree recipients
requested them. Johnson did not request his but in 1824 Edward Everett, then Professor of Greek Literature, was asked by President Kirkland to draw up citations for
some thirty-six LL.D. diplomas. In the case of Johnson the citation was as follows:
"'..• et dignissimum, Gulielmum Johnson, Caroliniensem curiae Rerumpublicarum Foederatarum Supremae Judicem, rerum, a Majoribus Nostris in hello forteter
ac feliciter gestarum, indagatorem diligentem'."
81
l O'NEALL 73 in sketch of William Johnson.
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domination by an aristocratic class. It was inevitable that Pinckney
should become a Federalist 82 who would look with fear and anxiety at
the French Revolution as a demonstration of what could also happen in
· a democracy. Johnson, son of an artisan, was not only openly and
vigorously opposed to these aristocratic trends, but in later years criticized the Society of the Cincinnati, of which Pinckney became president, 88 because the organization then stood, he believed, for the perpetuation of hereditary nobility and military caste in American life.84
Johnson found it necessary to advance the idea of a strong central government and became one of its strongest protagonists, but he did so. as contrasted with Pinckney-in the interests of popular government
according to the J e:ffersonian conception.
Johnson soon entered politics and was sent to represent Charleston
in the Legislature of South Carolina in 1794 at the age of twenty-three;
was reelected in 1796 and was chosen speaker .of the House at the age
of twenty-six, during his last term, after being reelected a third time. 8G
He became an active member of the J e:ffersonian Republican party of
which Governor Charles Pinckney, a cousin of Charles Coteswor-th
Pinckney, was then the head. The party, according to O'Neall "was
sustained by the most youthful talent of the State."
While in the legislature he was active and conscientious. "It was
chiefly by his efforts that the office of comptroller general was instituted. He investigated the irregular and arbitrary proceedings of
the county courts, and when they were superseded by the present circuit courts he was elected one of the judges of the new establishment.ns 6
Judge O'Neall, who wa~ a contemporary f1,nd an admirer of Johnson,
furnishes one of the few authentic-but too brief--summaries of this
period of Johnson's life. "During his legislative career," writes
O'Neall, "he had given much time and attention to the organization of
the State Judiciary; and one of his objects, in which, however, he unfortunately failed, but the importance of which every day has rendered
32 Pinckney became one of the leaders of the Federalist party. In 1800 Pinckney
was Federalist candidate for Vice-President and in 1804 and 1808 candidate for President.
33 He was president of the society from I 805 until his death 1825.
34
,2 WILLIAM JOHNSON 409.
85 On March 20, I 794 he married Sarah Nightingale Bennett, daughter of Thomas
and Anna Hayes (Warnock) Bennett and a sister of Governot Thomas Bennett. They
had two daughters. One daughter married Hon. Romulus M. Saunders, who was
member of Congress from North Carolina, and became Minister to Spain. Another
daughter married James G. Rowe, an Alabama planter.
'3G IO NEw AMERICAN CYCLOPAEDIA 36 (1859). Quoted from article on Justice
Johnson:
·
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more manifest, was the creation of a special Judge for Charleston. In
1799, the bill organizing our judiciary system, a system which with
some modifications still exists, was passed by the Legislature, and in
consequence of its provisions several Judges were appointed. Among
these, William Johnson, then speaker, and but twenty-eight years of
age, was elected to the Court of Common Pleas, along with Lewis
Trezevant and Ephraim Ramsay. He did not remain long upon the
State Bench, for a vacancy having occurred upon the Supreme Bench
of the United States, Mr. Jefferson, who was then President, and one
of whose chief public anxieties was to relieve the Supreme Court of the
federal character which he thought so dangerous to republic government, tendered the appointment to Judge Johnson, gover.n,ed, it may
fairly be supposed, by the happy association of a high judicial reputation and a sound political creed. Thus on the 6th March, 1 804, when
only thirty-two years of age, Judge Johnson had risen to the highest
official position open to the Bar of the Union, and which is generally
and properly the last reward of a widely extended reputation and long
laborious years." 87

E. Becomes Justice of Supreme Court
Johnson succeeded Justice Alfred Moore. His name was sent to the
Senate for confirmation· on March 22, 1804. Jefferson, it is true, had
gone out to find a successor to Justice Moore who would reflect his own
political views and proceeded with considerable care.
Jefferson's search in the ranks of the adherents of "the dominant
party" seems to have centered in South Carolina. He had listed as possibilities in his personal memorandum Pringle, Waities, Trisvan and
Gilliard. Two of these, Waities and Trisvan, (who Gaillard Hunt
thinks was no doubt meant for Judge Lewis C. Trezevant) sat as associate justices with Johnson on the Constitutional Court. Gaillard Hunt
in his discussion of Office-Seeking during Jefferson's Administration
sets out a copy of Jefferson's memorandum of February 17, 1804 as
follows:
"1804 Feb. 17. Characters of the lawyers of S.C. W.H.T.S.
"John Julius Pringle. Waities. These are the two principal of
those called republicans. They are of old standing, and highest
repute. Pringle was wavering once, was even with the federalists, ,
but got back again. But both are so moderate, that they only vote
with the republicans; they never meddle otherwise. Pringle is
so rich that he confines his practice to Charleston, and it is thought
87

I O'NEALL

73.
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_· would not accept a commission which should call him from there.
Waities is so sickly that he would not be able to ride, neither would
possess the confidence of the republicans. ·
"William Johnson. A state judge, an excellent lawyer, prompt,
eloquent, of irreproachable character, republican connections, and
of good nerves in his political principles, about 35 years old, was
speaker some years.
"Trisvan. A state judge of equal respectability, or very nearly
so, and indeed in every qualification as Johnson, same age, but of
such total feebleness of body as to be quite unfit.
"Gilliard. Was speaker of the assembly, equal in talents to
Johnson ... all his connections were revolutionary tories, and their
estates confiscated. They got something back again, at least his
father did. This young man was educated abroad, he returned
soured against those in power for what his family had suffered.
He found he had nothing to hope from them, and joined those
who now constitute the republican party. His conduct while in the
assembly was uniformly firm, almost vindictive; yet in an instance or two, from family influence or interest he has swerved a
little from sound principle. Upon the whole, his standing is not quite as respectable as that of Johnson." 88
·Johnson was fortunate in having had some experience as an appellate judgf;!. While a judge of the Common Pleas Court he had sat,
according to the South Carolina practice, as associate justice of the Constitutional Court for ewer three years. 80 His duties on this court in38 3 AM. H1sT. REv. 282 (1897-1898). John Julius Pringle named by Jefferson
in his memorandum was Attorney General of South Carolina and a son of Robert
Pringle whose biography appears in 1 O'NEALL 392, together with those of Waties,
Trezevant and Gaillard.
Jefferson tendered Pringle the office of Attorney General of the United States in
1805, which he declined on account of family responsibility. 2 O'NEALL 5.
See also John H. Wolfe, "Jeffersonian Democracy in South Carolina," 24 JAMES
SPRUNT STUDIES IN H1sToRY AND PoLITICAL ScrnNcE 123 and 196 (1940).
On a number of other occasions a President had sought a South Carolinian for
membership on the Supreme Court. In 1789 President Washington appointed John
'Rutledge associate justice but he resigned in I 79 I and became chief justice of the South
Carolina. In 1795 Washington appointed Rutledge chief justice-; Rutledge resigned
his chief justiceship in South Carolina and accepted and presided at the August term
of court but the senate refused to confirm his nomination, whereas it ha.d unanimously
confirmed him as associate justice. When Rutledge resigned in 1791 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and Edward Rutledge respectively were offered the associate judgeship
but both declined "saying, amongst other reasons, that they could be of more service
to the Unite_d States in the State Legislature." I O'NEALL 26-27 and 2 id. at 135.
89
The decisions and opinions of the Constitutional Court are reported in Brevard's Soqth _Carolina Reports by Joseph Brevard, who became a member of that
court. Other opinions by Johnson prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court
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SII

eluded also the review of his own decisions as a district court judge.40
Here he not only broadened his capacity for self-scrutiny but laid some
of the foundation for his strong insistence on the idea of judicial fallimay be found in Bay's South Carolina Reports ( 1811). O'N eall furnishes a brief account
of the history and function of the Constitutional Court: "The present Circuit Conrt
system has been continued with many successive alterations from '99 to the present
day. By the Constitution of '90, the Judges were required to meet at the conclusion of
the Circuits in Columbia, and thence proceed to Charleston and hear motions for new
trials, in arrest of judgment, and such points of law as might be submitted to them.
This, as I understand from Judge Brevard's introduction, was part of the digest proposed by Pendleton, Burke and Grimke, under the Act of 1785. The Court thus
established, was called the Constitutional Court, which remained unchanged (with the
exception that the Constitution in 1816 was so altered as to allow the Legislature to
fix the time and places of the meeting of the Constitutional Court) until 1824, when
a separate Court of Appeals was established. This remained until 1835, when it fell,
and the Circuit Court Law Judges, after trying the mass meeting of all the Judges, for
a term or two, resumed the double duties of hearing and deciding first, and in the last
resort." 1 O'NEALL xi.
40
In South Carolina there was a practice in the circuit courts "that every cause
was examined by a bench of judges of whom at least three out of four take it up as new
and without any prepossession." In the chancery courts an appeal could be made "to
a bench of five or at least four judges, all of whom except one take the case up anew
and without any bias from having presided over the court from whose decision the
appeal was made." 2 DAVID RAMSEY, THE H1sTORY OF SouTH CAROLINA TO THE YEAR
1808, pp. 156, 157 (1809).
The argument in the case of Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch (8 U.S.) 241 (1808),
in which Johnson's own decree in the circuit court was reversed, lasted nine days. Some
of the most eminent counsel of the day participated. Upon the opening of the case
six judges were present and, out of the six, three had given opinions in the circuit
court upon the principal points about to be argued. William Cranch, reporting the case,
remarked that if each judge who had given an opinion should withdraw from the
bench as had been customary heretofore, there would not remain a quorum to try the
cause, and that it was thereupon agreed by all the judges that they would sit. Justices
Chase, Johnson and Livingston expressed themselves strongly against the practice of a
judge leaving the bench because he had decided the case in the court below; Johnson
said he should not insist on the practice if it should be generally abandoned by the
judges. The whole six judges, with the exception of Todd who was absent, sat in the
cause "so that the practice of retiring seems to be abandoned" (note at p. 243). _The
case involved the question of whether the federal court could examine the jurisdiction
of a foreign tribunal. Johnson dissented on the question of the effect of sentences of
foreign prize courts.
Johnson, while sitting as an associate judge of the Constitutional Court of South
Carolina together with the other justices, according to the practice in South Carolina,
sat a number of times upon the appeal of his own cases. See for instance, Anderson v.
Robson & Jones, 1 Brevard (S.C.) 263 (1803); Connolly v. Stewart, 1 id. 271
(1803); Shoolbred v. Vanderhorst, l id. 315 (1804); Gourdine v. Graham, 1 id. 329
(1804). In a few cases he expressed unwillingness. Thus, in Ellis v. Falconer, r id.
77 at 79 ( r 802) he gave no opinion "having presided in the district court, and decided the motion there"; same in Hamilton v. Bostwick, l id. 221 (1803). In McFadden v. Haley, l id. 96 at 102-103 (1801) the reporter noted: ''Waties and
Trezevant, justices, being of a different opinion, the court was at first divided, till
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bility. It was a testing ground for a realistic expression of some of his
later views 41 which were here focused, nevertheless, in narrower
compass.

F. Influences Restoration of Seriatim Opinions and
Becomes the First Dissenter
Before Justice William Johnson ascended the Supreme Court bench
the dissenting opinion was seldom more than a feeble finger of protest.
It is certain that it had not even begun to become a democratic instrument for individual expression. Johnson seized upon the dissenting
OP.inion as a creative instrument for the analysis of the principles of
government which were being newly tried. He always disagreed constructively, often vigorously, and always creatively.
Almost from the, beginning the Supreme Court had followed the
practice of delivering its opinions seriatim. The first case so reported
is State of Georgia v. Brailsford. 42 The procedure was for the justice
who had last received his commission to deliver the first opinion and so
on in inverse order of seniority with the last opinion delivered by the
senior justice. From the year :r 790 until Johnson took his seat on the
Supreme Court only one "dissenting'' opinion was delivered and that
Johnson and Brevard, justices, agreed to deliver their opinion, which they at first
declined doing, Johnson, J. having granted the non-suit in the district cc;iurt, and
Brevard J. having been of counsel in the cause, for the plaintiffs, and brought up the
motion to this court; and they both decided in favor of the motion. Johnson, J.
doubted, at first, but at length concurred entirely with the majority of the court, that
the objection ought to have been taken by plea in abatement, and could not be taken
advantage of otherwise.''
41
See, for instance, State v. Pitman, 1 id. 33 (1801), which was an indictment ,
for uttering and publishing counterfeit bills of the United States under the Act of 1786.
The court held the indictment would lie even though the same offense was punishable
by the laws of the Federal Government. Johnson, in that opinion presaging his subsequent views on the dual relationship of state and federal sover~ignty, said in part:
"The national government may pass such laws as may be proper and necessary to
avoid the mischiefs arising from the counterfeiting, and passing, as true, the forged bills
of credit of the bank of the nation; but it cannot be maintained that the several State
governments may not also pass such laws, as they shall deem necessary, to the welfare of
their internal concerns, in relation to the same subject. The power and authority which
may be used and exercised by each, in this behalf, is by no means incompatible, but
perfectly reconcilable and consistent'' (p. 34). (Italics the writer's).
42
2 Dallas (2 U.S.) 402 at 405 (1792). Se;iatim opinions are reported in the
famous case of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas (2 U.S.) 420 (1793); and in Penhallow
v. Doane's administrators, 3 Dallas (3 U.S.) 54.(1795); in Talbot v. Jansen, 3 Dallas
(3 U.S.) 133 (1795); in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dallas (3 U.S;) 199 (1796). To these
should be added other cases discussed in the same paragraph of the text and notes and
a few other minor cases.
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w~ by Mr. Justice Wilson in Hylton v. United States.4§3 It consisted
of very brief paragraph. Justice Wilson delivered a minority fullblossomed dissenting opinion-the first of its kind in the Supreme
Court-in Wiscart v. D'Auchy 44 in which Justice Patterson silently
concurred. Mr. Justice Iredell concurred in the historic case of Calder
v. Bull 45 and in Sims's Lessee v. Irvine 46 but for reasons differing from
those of the majority of the Court.
On October 27, 1822, Thomas Jefferson, a lawyer and always interested in the judicial process, wrote to Johnson from Monticello on.
the subject of seriatim opinion. There were signs on the horizon which
were cause for anxiety and Jefferson, now an old man, turned his attention again to the Supreme Court. He wrote at considerable length to
Johnson displaying an unmistakable confidence and approval of Johnson's devotion to the Constitution as he, Jefferson, understood it:

a

"There is a subject respecting the practice of the court of which
you are a member, which h~s long weighed on my mind, on which
I have long thought I would write to y~u, and which I will take
this opportunity of doing. It is in truth a delicate undertaking, &
yet such is my opinion of your candor and devotedness to the
Constitution, in it's true spirit, that I am sure I shall meet your
approbation in unbosoming myself to you. The subject of my uneasiness is the habitual mode of making up and delivering the
opinions of the supreme court of the U. S.
"You know that from the earliest ages of the English law,
from the ·date of the year-books, at least, to the end of the Ild
George, the judges of England, in all but self-evident cases, delivered their opinions seriatim, with the reasons and authorities
which governed their decisions. If they sometimes consulted together, and gave a general opinion, it was so rarely as not to excite
either alarm or notice. Besides the light which their separate arguments threw on the subject, and the instruction communicated by
their several modes of reasoning, it shewed whether the judges
were unanimous or divided, and gave accordingly more or less
weight to the judgment as a precedent. It sometimes happened
too that when there were three opinions against one, the reasoning
of the one was so much the most cogent as to become afterwards
the law of the land. When Ld. Mansfield came to the bench he
introduced the habit of caucusing opinions. The judges met at
48

3 Dallas (3 U.S.) 171 (1796).
3 Dallas (3 U.S.) 321 (1796).
45
3 Dallas (3 U.S.) 386 (1798).
46
3 Dallas (3 U.S.) 425 (1799). See also Bingham v. Cabot, 3 Dallas (3 U.S.)
19 (1795); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dallas (4 U.S.) 14 (1800).
44
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their chambers or elsewhere, secluded from the presence of the
public, and made up what was to be delivered as the opinion of the
court. On the retirement of Mansfield, Ld. Kenyon put an end to
the practice, and the judges returned to that of seriatim opinions,
and practice it habitually to this day, I believe. I am not acquainted with the late reporters, d<? not possess them, and state
the fact from the information of others. To come now to ourselves I know nothing of what is done in other states, but in this
our great and good Mr. Pendleton was, after the revolution,
placed· at the head of the court of Appeals. He adored L~. Mansfield, & considered him as the greatest luminary of law that any
age had ever produced, and he introduced into the court over
which he presided, Mansfield's practice of making up opinions
in secret & delivering them as the Oracles of the court, in mass.
Judge Roane, when he came to that bench, broke up the practice,
refused to hatch judgments, in Conclave, or to let others deliver
opinions for him. At what time the seriatim opinions ceased in the
supreme Court of the U.S., I am not informed. They continued
I know to the end of the 3d Dallas in I 800. Later than which I
have no Reporter of that court. About that time the present
C. J. came to the bench. Whether he carried the practice of Mr.
Pendleton to it, or who, or when I do not know; but I understand
from others it is now the habit of the court, & I suppose it true
from the cases sometimes reported in the newspapers, and others
which I casually see, wherein I observe that the opinions were uniformly prepared in private. Some of these cases too have been of
such importance, of such difficulty, and the decisions so grating to
a portion of the public as to have merited the fullest explanation
from every judge seriatim, of the reasons which had produced
such convictions on his mind. It was interesting to the public to
know whether these decisions were really unanimous, or might not
perhaps be ·of 4. against 3. and consequently prevailing by the preponderance of one voice only. The Judges holding their offices for
life are under two responsibilities only. I. Impeachment. 2. Individual reputation. But this practice compleatly withdraws them
from both. For nobody knows what opinions any individual member gave in any case, nor even that he who delivers the opinion,
concurred in it himself. Be the opinion therefore ever so impeachable, having been done in the dark it can be proved on no
one. As to the 2d guarantee, personal reputation, it is shielded
compleatly. The practice is certainly convenient for the lazy, the
modest & the incompetent. It saves them the trouble of developing their opinion methodically and even of making up an opinion
at all. That of seriatim argument shews whether every judge has

1944}

JUSTICE JOHNSON, DISSENTER

taken the trouble of understanding the case, of investigating it
minutely, and of forming an opinion for himself, instead of pinning it on another's sleeve. It would certainly be right to abandon
this practice in order to give to our ~tizens one and all, that confidence in their judges which must be so desirable to the judges
themselves, and so important to the cement of the union~ During
the administration of Genl. Washington, and while E. Randolph
was Attorney General, he was required by Congress to digest th€
judiciary laws into a single one, with such amendments as might
be thought proper. He prepared a section requiring the Judges to
give their opinions seriatim, in writing, to be recorded in a distinct
volume. Other business prevented this bill from being taken up,
and it passed off, but such a volume would have been the best
possible book of reports, and the better, as unincumbered with the
hired sophisms and perversions of Counsel." 47
47
IO PAUL LEICESTER FORD, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 223-225
(1899). The Supreme Court has recently vigorously criticized and condemned evidence
obtained in secret chambers, insisting that a public trial requires that the public see
the accused is fairly dealt with. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, (U.S.) 64 S. Ct. 921 decided
May 1, 1944, and reference in footnotes collected by Justice Black. See particularly
note 10. Justice Black, quoting from CooLEY's CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, points
to the important effect that the presence of interested spectators has in keeping the triers
keenly alive "to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions"
(p. 927, n. IO). It is the view of the writer that the broadening of the evidence base
submits to open discussion many things which are now determined introspectively in
judicial chambers. See 19 THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 239-248
(July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942); also Mid-West Theatres v. Co-operative Theatres,
(D. C. Mich. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 216 at 220. Also Waite, "Judge-Made Law And The
Education of Lawyers," 30 A.B.A.J. 253 (1944).
William R. Woodward, in a sharp criticism of the opinion of the court in the
patent case of Potts v. Coe, (App. D.C. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 470 in 57 HARV. L. REv.
564 (1944), takes the court to task with the statement that the court "indulged in a
discussion which strongly suggests that, in its opinion, the patent system is designed to
encourage haphazard and hunch research rather than research which is scientific in
method as well as subject matter" (p. 568). He finds fault with the notion that genius
is necessarily erratic and with the test of "mystical intuition by pure luck." Woodward
thus, without stating so expressly, attacks the introspective secret method of judicial
decision as the following further statements indicate: "The court had evidently made a
study of the relevant 'modern experience' without the assistance of the parties, taking
judicial notice of various hearings, reports, and other public documents" (p. 565).
Elsewhere Woodward significantly points to the root of the pfoblem: "Such generalization, especially in view of the unaoailability of any comprehensive study of the factJ,
would not seem to fall within the proper scope of judicial notice" (p. 570). (Italics
added). It is the view of the writer that the court acted within the scope of judicial
notice as it now is understood but that judicial notice is no longer adapted to the adequate presentation of the complex problems arising in fact situations. It is based upon a
psychologically obsolete notion, partially supported by fact, that intuition is wiser than
knowledge.
Hendrik W. Van Loon, discussing the brutality and horrnr of the Inquisition,
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On December ro, r822Johnson replied to Jefferson: 48
''While I was on our State-bench I was accustomed to delivering seriatim Opinions in our Appellate Court, and was not a
little surprised to find our Chief Justice in the Supreme Court
delivering all the opinions in Cases in which he sat, even in.some
Instances when contrary to his own Judgment and Vote. But I
remonstrated in vain; the Answer was he is willing to take the
trouble and it is a Mark of Respect to him. I soon however found
out the real Cause. Cushing was incompetent. Chase could not be
got to think or write-Paterson was a slow man. and willingly
declined the Trouble, and the other two (Marshall and Washington) are commonly estimated as one Judge. Some Case soon
occurred in which I differed from my Brethren, and I felt it a
thing of Course to deliver my Opinion. But, during the rest of the
Session I heard nothing but Lectures on the Indecency of Judges
cutting at each other, and the Loss of Reputation which the Virginia appellate Court had sustained by pursuing such a Course.
At length I found that I must either submit to Circumstances or
become such a Cypher in our Consultations as to effect no good at
all. I therefore bent to the Current, and persevered until I got
them to adopt the Course they now pursue, which is to appoint
some one to delive:i; the Opinion of the Majority, but to leave it to
the rest of the Judges to record their Opinions or not ad Libitum."
On March 4, r823, Jefferson again wrote to Johnson from Monticello and again launched into the subject of seriatim opinions: 49
"I cannot lay down my pen without recurring to one of the
subjects of my former lett'er, for in truth there is no danger I apprehend so prnch as the consolidation of our government by the
finds enough "to justify those who claim that all secret tribunals are an insufferable evil
and should never again be tolerated in a community of civilized people." TOLERANCE
141• (1925).
Justice Holmes, despite his courage in many directions, never completely disengaged himself from the idea of an area of isolation just as Johnson was unable to escape
the "public eye" which might gaze behind the curtain. , (Note 50, infra.) Said
Holmes: "There is nothing I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its conte~ts to prevent' the making of social
experiments that an important part of the community desires in the insulated chambers
afforded by the several states, even though the experiment may seem fatal or even
obnoxious to me and to those whose judgment I must respect." Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U.S. 312 at 343, 42 S. Ct. 124 (1921). (Italics added.)
48
Th~ excerpt is quoted by Morgan, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and The
Constitution," 57 HARV. L. REv. 328 at 333 (1944).
49
IO PAUL LEICESTER FoRD, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 246 at 248
et seq. (1899).
I
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noiseless, and therefore unalarming, instrumentality of the supreme court. This is the form in which federalism now arrays
itself, and consolidation is the present principle of distinction between republicans and the pseudo-republicans but real federalists.
I must comfort myself with the hope that the judges will see the
importance and the duty of giving th;ir country the only evidence
they can give of fidelity to its constitution and integrity in the administration of its laws; that is to say, by every one's giving his
opinion seriatim and publicly on the cases he decides. Let him
prove by his reasoning that he has read the papers, that he has considered the case, that in the application of the law to it, he uses his
own judgment independently and unbiased by party views and
personal favor or disfavor. Throw himself in every case· on God
and his country; both will excuse him for error and value him for
his honesty. The very idea of cooking up opinions in conclave,
begets suspicions that something passes which fears the public ear,
and this, spreading by degrees, must produce at some time abridgement of tenure, facility of removal, or some other modification
which may promise a remedy. For in truth there is at this time
more hostility to the federal judiciary, than to any other organ of
the government.
"I should greatly prefer, as you do, four judges to any
greater number. Great lawyers are not over abundant, and the
multiplication of judges only enable the weak to out-vote the wise,
and three concurrent opinions out of four give a strong presumption of right.
"I cannot better prove my entire confidence in your candor,
than by the frankness with which I commit myself to you, and to
this I add with truth, assurances of the sincerity of my great esteem
and respect."
Johnson replied on April II, 1823 to Jefferson's letter of March
4th: &o
"On the Subject of seriatim Opinions in the Supreme Court I
have thought much, and have come to the Resolution to adopt
your Suggestion on all Subjects of general Interest; particularly
constitutional questions. On minor Subjects it is of little Importance. . . .
.
"I cannot I acknowledge but flatter myself that in the main
the Country is satisfied with our Decisions; and I \1,rged our
Friend Stevenson to bring forward his Motion on the 25th Section
of the Judiciary act, in the Hope that there would be some Expression of public Sentiment upon the Subject. The Resolution
50

1

So. CAR. H1sT.

&: GEN.

MAG. 209-210 (1900).
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unfortunately could not be taken up at the late Session, and we are
still left to conjecture. I acknowledge that some things have fallen
from particular Judges which are exceptionable, and I exceedingly
regret their Publication. But' when the Decisions are examined
upon their own Merits independently of the bad or defective
Reasons of the Judge who delivers the~, I do flatter myself that
all.in which I ever concurred will stand constitutional scrutiny.
It will be impossible to avoid however conducting the 'most of our
Business in Conclave; for I do verily believe that there is no
Body of Men, legislative judicial or executive, who could preserve
the public Respect for a single year, if the public Eye were permitted always to look behind the Curtain. I have had to examine
the human Character in various Situations; Your Experience has
been infinitely greater but I never met with but one Man who
could absolutely leave his Vanity and Weaknesses at home! And
have been often absolutely astonished at the Predominance of little
Passions over Men in the most elevated Stations."
On June I 2th of the same year J e:fferson, writing with two crippled
wrists, one scarcely able to move his pen, the other to hold his paper,
answered with obvious satisfaction: 51
"I rejoice in the example you set of seriatim opinions. I have
heard it often noticed, & always with high approbation. some of
your brethren will be encouraged to follow.it occasionally; and in
time it may be felt by all, as a duty, and the sound practice of the
primitive court be again restored. why should not every judge be
asked his opinion, and give it from the bench, if only by yea, or
nay? besides ascertaining the fact of his opinion, :which the public
have a right to know, in order to judge whether it is impeachable
or not, it would shew the opinions were unanimous or not, and
thus settle more exactly the weight of their authority."
Johnson apparently did not yield to Je:fferson's criticisms of the
secret sessions of the Supreme Court held in "conclave." With all of
51

Id. at 12.
Jefferson had apparently sent to James Madison a -copy of the letter he had sent
to Judge Johnson. Madison replied to Jefferson on June 27, 1823 returning the copy
of the Johnson letter. Madison also had something to say about seriatim opinions.
"I agree entirely with you on the subject of seriatim opinions by the Judges,
which you have placed in so strong a light in your letter to Judge Johnson, whose
example, it seems, is in favor of the practice. An argument addressed to others, all of
whose dislikes to it are not known, may be a delicate experiment. My particular connexion with Judge Todd, whom I expect to see, may tempt me to_ touch on the
subject; and, if encouraged, to present my views of it which, through him, may find
the way to his intimates." 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 327
(1865).
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his boldness and realism Johnson fell short of the more complete
objectivity to which Jefferson was able to adhere. Jefferson was ready
to go the whole length of popular government whereas Johnson, despite his preachings against fear, was himself fearful of the "public
Eye" which might look "behind the Curtain."
The two important legal procedural institutions which remain secret
are the session of the jury and the conference of the appellate court.
The jury, while still considered an important institution and safeguard
of liberty, is rapidly declining because of its lack of competence and its
secrecy. Provisions for voluntary waiver of jury trial and provisions for
mandatory waiver where procedural forms are not strictly followed
have greatly reduced the resort to jury trials in both civil and criminal
cases. During prohibition days, it will be recalled, there was also bargaining between criminals and the judges who held out the promise of
lighter sentences as the price of a waiver of a jury trial, thereby relieving
the congestion of crowded dockets. The widespread judicial encouragement by court rule and statute of summary judgment and declaratory judgment procedure-both of which do away with a jury-has
been heeded by the bar and substantial inroads into the jury system
have been made by this turn of the practice. The psychological reasons
for the secrecy of the jury trial and the appellate conference are, of
course, complex. One possible reason is the fear of retaliation which
dates back to the practice of accusation of the judge, to those days when
the judge had to render a "correct" decision at his peril. At the present
time, when a trial is had before the trial judge without the benefit of a
jury, he must reach his decision in the face of possible criticism, since the
individual judge.is the sole one who is responsible. While his motives
may not be clearly revealed, at least his action is open to public scrutiny.
The problem is a psychological one rather than one merely of legal
procedure. More complete objectivity in the light of advancement in
the studies of human behavior would require us to re-examine those
aspects of human conduct which cause us to frown upon secrecy in legislative assemblies, trial proceedings and legislative hearings, but nevertheless consider it one of the bulwarks of liberty to receive a judgment
or verdict from a closed door when it issues in the form of the verdict of
a jury or the decjsion of an appellate court. Much of the divergence
which exists between the unconscious underlying motives for decisions
and the printed opinions and decrees may be traced to a failure to follow Jefferson's advice. Secrecy is the protective chamber both of rationalization and irrational aggression. It may, indeed, be some time before
any change in this practice occurs, but it is not too soon to study the
dynamic causes for the secrecy in these situations.
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The practice of delivering seriatim opinions had been deliberately
brushed aside by Marshall. Hampton L. Carson credits Johnson as
being "the first to break in upon the practice, followed for many years,
of permitting the Chief Justice to act as organ of the Court, and restored
the ancient habit of seriatim opinions, wherever there was any marked
di:fference of judgment. The old system had given great dissatisfaction,
as owing to the age and infirmities of Chase and Cushing, and frequent·
absences of Todd, two judges sometimes practically became a ~ajoi-ity
of six, and three a majority of seven." 52 From the time that Chief
Justice Marshall ascended the bench of the Court in 'r8or until r804,
which is the year Johnson took his seat, one does not find a single
seriatim opinion reported. The only departure from unanimity during
that period was a brief concurring opinion of Justice Chase in Head and
Armory v. Providence Insurance Co.58 consisting of one sentence.
52

1 CARSON, THE H1sTORY OF THE SUPREME CoURT 229 (1892). Justice Todd
was nominated to the Supreme Court in 1807.
58
2 Cranch (6 U.S.) 127 at 169 (1804). William Draper Lewis in the article
on John Marshall in 14 ENcYcLOPEDJA BruTANNJCA, 14th ed., p. 968 et seq. says of
the practice which Marshall put into effect: "At the time of Marshall's appointment it
was generally considered that the Supreme Court was the one department of the new
Government which had failed in its purpose. John Jay; the first chief-justice, who had
resigned in 1795, had just declined a reappointment to the chief-justiceship on the
ground that he had left the bench_ perfectly convinced that the court would never
acquire proper weight and dignity, its. organization being fatally defective. The advent
of the new chief-justice was marked by a change in the conduct of business in the court.
Since its organization, following the prevailing English custom, the judges had pronounced their opinions seriatim. But beginning with the December term I 80 I, the chiefjustice became practically the sole mouthpiece of the court. For I I years the opinions are
almost exclusively his, and there are few recorded dissents. The change was admirably
adapted to streµgthen the power and dignity of the court. The chief-justice embodied
the majesty of the judicial department of the Government almost as fully as the
president stood for the power of the executive. That this change was acquiesced in by
bis associates without diminishing their good will towards their new chief is testimony to
the persuasive force of Marshall's personality; for his associates were not men of mediocre ability. After the advent of Mr. Justice Joseph Story the practice was abandoned.
Marshall, however, still delivered the opinion in the great majority of cases, and in
practically all cases of any importance involving the interpretation of the Constitution.
During the course of his judicial life his associates were as a rule men of learning and
ability. During most of the time the majority were the appointees of Democratic presidents, and before their elevation to the bench supposed to be out of sympathy with the
federalistic ideas of the chief-justice, Yet in matters pertaining to constitutional construction, they seem to have had hardly any other function than to add the weight of
their silent concurrence to the decision of their great chief. Thus the task of expounding
the Constitution during the most critical period of its history was his, and it was given
to him to preside over the Supreme Court when it was called upon to decide four cases
of vital importance: Marbury o. Madison, M'Cullocli· o. Maryland, Coliens o. Virginia
and Gibbons o. Ogden. In each of these cases it is Marshall who writes the opinion of
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Albert J. Beveridge, strongly admiring Marshall, had explained this
move on the part of the chief justice as a necessary realistic step in the
interests_ of unity. As chief justice, Beveridge tells us, "he quietly began
to strengthen the Supreme Court. He did this by one of those acts of
audacity that later marked the assumptions of power which rendere,d
his career historic. For the first time the Chief Justice disregarded the
custom of the delivery of opinions by the Justices seriatim, and, instead,
calmly assumed the function of announcing, himself, the views of that
tribunal. Thus Marshall took the first step in impressing the country
with the unity of the highest court of the Nation." H On the other
hand, John M. Shirley, who was more appreciative of Johnson's
talents, and considered Johnson to be "keen, critical, sagacious, able,
and honest," was provoked by this repressive influence of the chief
justice. "Before Marshall's appointment," says Shirley censuringly,
"the Supreme Court followed the English practice, under which each
judge who sat in a cause gave an opinion whenever he thought there
was occasion for it; but, in general, those judges ·who presided at the
circuit declined to sit in bane, except in a case of equal division. Under
Marshall ( who argued but a single cause in that court before he became
chief justice) this practice was rooted out, so far as his influence extended; the judges reheard the causes which they had decided at the
circuit; the practice of giving individual opinions was repressed; the
practice became general of making one judge, 'the organ of the court,'
of virtually assigning causes, and of taking them home for the purpose
of writing up opinions in vacation; and of having an opinion read by a
single judge as the opinion of the court, when the judgment reeeived
the assent of but three, and sometimes two, of the judges, and the reasoning of a less number. This vicious practice oc_casioned great dissatisfaction." 55
the court; in each the continued existence of the peculiar Federal system established by
the Constitution depended on the action of the court, and in each the court adopted
a principle which is now generally perceived to be essential to the preservation of the
United States as a Federal State." The statement that the function of the other jus- ·
tices was to concur can no longer b.e accepted without qualification.
H 3 BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JoHN MARSHALL 15-16 (1916). See also Charles
Warren ''The First Decade of·the Supreme Court of the United States," 7 UNIV. Cm.
L. REv. 631 at 637 (1940).
H JoHN M. SHIRLEY, THE DARTMOUTH CoLLEGE CAUSES 309-310 (1879).
· Shirley contil\ues, p. 310: "The primitive court consisted of five judges. It was
increased to six, and afterward& to seven, For years it was necessary for two of these
judges, in general, to ride the circuit together; not infrequently, after the accession of
Marshall, but four judges held the general term at Washington, and constituted the
court when many important causes were decided. Two of the judges were aged and
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Johnson, before becoming an associate justice of the Supreme
· Court, as he hi,mself pointed out in his letter to Jefferson of December
IO, 1822, had delivered a number of seriatim opinions in the South
Carolina Constitutional Court, where the English practice had prevailed. 56 In United States v. Fisher,5 1 the first case in which he participated after assuming his duties as a justice, he did not write an opinion.
In 1805 he wrote a brief concurring opinion in Huidekoper's Lessee v.
Douglass. 58 In 1807 he delivered one of his ablest dissents in the case
of Ex Parte Bollman 59 which arose out of the Aaron Burr conspiracy.
If, as Johnson himself seems to say, the practice of delivering seriatim
opinions had been generally abandoned, he had himself, nevertheless,
continued through the years· to deliver concurring and dissenting opinions-which may be considered historically as variations of the seriatim
op1mon.
Johnson wrote in all some one hundred sixty-nine opinions as associate justice of the Supre~e Court and of these some thirty-one were
dissenting opinions. He also dissented a few times without writing an
opinion. To this impressive percentage of dissents, many_ of which
expressed differing views on the most important constitutional issues
of the times, must be added about twenty-one concurring opinions. In
this group of concurring opinions will be found some of his best
opinions, wherein, although he followed the majority of the Court, his
reasoning was so different 60 as to possess the quality of real dissentsinfirm, and one of them, for years before his death, was so superannuated that he practically left his circuit, a most important one, to take care of itself, and was a nonentity
at Washington. The new chief had, from his acknowledged ability and force, and
weight of character, and from his tact and diplomatic skill, great influence with his
brethren. For years he prepared a large share of the opinions. When an occasion required he was an adept in 'patching up' compromise judgments and opinions. Confident
that he was right, he sometimes entered up judgment, and read opinions as the opinion
of the court, without being as careful as a discreet judge ought, to find out whether his
opinion was that of a majority or minority of the court. In Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch,
41, he delivered the leading opinion, and ordered the judment of the Circuit Court to
be reversed, etc., when in fact but a single judge agreed with him, as afterwards appeared in Hudson v. Guestier, 6 Cranch, 281. In one of the cloud of opinions delivered by Marshall at the trial of Aaron Burr, he admits that he made a mistake of a
similar character in Bollman's case...."
56
State v. Pittman, I Brevard (S.C.) 33 (1801); Hammon & Hattaway v. Smith,
. 1 id. I IO ( I 802); Marsh & Dabney v. Muir & Boyd, I id. 134 ( I 802); Pledger v.
Mandeville & Others, I id. 286 (1803); and others.
57 2 Cranch (6 U.S.) 358 (1805).
58
3 Cranch (7 U.S.) 1 (1805).
59
4 Cranch (8 U.S.) 75 (1807).
60 Though there is room for some differences of opinion as to the computation,
the writer cannot agree with Corwin's statement_ that even Johnson's "separate opinions,
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so much so as to perplex some scholars. In these seriatim opinions, consisting of dissents and concurring opinions, is revealed the constitutional
jurisprudence and dynamic conception of the Constitution which ultimately was introduced into the Court by Justices Holmes and Brandeis
and their followers.
During Marshall's incumbency eleven hundred and six opinions, it
has been estimated, were filed by the Supreme Court. Five hundred
and nineteen were by Marshall and, of these, eight in all were dissenting opinions. 61 "Few decisions upon constitutional questions," Justice
Story declared in r828, "have been made in which he [Marshall] has
not delivered the opinion of the court; and in these few the duty
devolved upon others to their own regret, either because he did not sit
in the cause, or from motives of delicacy abstained from taking an active
part." 62 There were times, however, when Johnson expressed Federalist views which Marshall was yet fearful to sponsor openly. Beveridge
probably goes too far in his adulation of Marshall in suggesting that
Marshall inspired such views. 68

G. Marshall, Story and Johnson
The reputation of Justice Johnson as one of our truly eminent constitutional jurists has also suffered undeservedly by comparison with
Justice Joseph Story, who was appointed in 1811 by President Madison
to succeed Justice Cushing. Story has come down to us in history as
Marshall's outstanding contemporary. St0ry, who began as a Republithough they sometimes challenge Marshall's more sweeping premises and bolder method
of reasoning, are after all mostly concurring ones." EDWARD S. CoRWIN, JoHN
MARSHALL AND THE CoNSTITUTION II5 (1919). Compare statistics of Morgan in
"Mr. Justice William Johnson and The Constitution," 57 HARV. L. REv. 328 at 332
( 1944). He lists thirty-three dissenting opinions and twenty-four concurring ones. _
61
These figures are found in the address of Frederick W. Lehman contained in 2
JOHN DILLON, MARSHALL, LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES 480 (1903).
62
Quoted by SHIRLEY, THE DARTMOUTH CoLLEGE CAUSES 395 (1879).
68
See Beveridge's discussion of Johnson's dissent in Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 (1824); 4 BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JoHN MARSHALL 394
(1916). This might also be said of Johnson's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat.
(22 U.S.) 1 (1824), which was decided in the same year.
Writing to Justice Story, Marshall commented on Johnson's daring opinion in
Elkinson v. Deliesseline, g Fed. Cas. No. 4366 (see note 2, infra) with gleeful disapproval. Referring to a law similar to the South Carolina law the chief justice said:
"We have its twin brother in Virginia; a case has been brought before me in which I
might have considered its constit1:tionality, had I chosen to do so; but it was not absolutely necessary, and as I am not fond of butting against a wall in sport, I escaped on the
construction of the act." Quoted in 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME CouRT IN UNITED
STATE!. HISTORY 86 ( 1922).
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can and ended as a Marshall-Federalist, was an erudite man, a scholar
and a prolific opinion writer. But he thought of the judiciary in terms
of power and lacked Johnson's realism and capacity of self-scrutiny.
While Story has peen called Marshall's "really invaluable aid among
his associates," 64 Story himself said of Johnson in I 808 that he had "a
strong mathematical hea<l;, and. considerable soundness of erudition,"
although he later felt that Johnson's views on certain constitutional
questions were "peculiar." 65 That Story did not really_ understand
Johnson is now obvious, and is explainable now in the light of Johnson's
very advanced thinking.
Despite the preponderance of the Marshall following, it has been
suggested that Marshall might have been instructed by the learning of
"his associates, Bushrod Washington, Johnson, Paterson, Cushing and
Thompson." 66 Chief Justice Waite has been quoted as saying that
"great as he (Marshall) was, he was made greater by those about
him.... He sat with Paterson, with Bushrod Washington, with William
Johnson, with Livingston, with Story, and with Thompson"; 67 and
Hampton L. Carson "would not abate one tithe from the just fame or
pluck a single leaf from the laurels of Bushrod Washington, Joseph
Story, Brockholst Livingston or William Johnson." ~8
It remained for one who considered Marshall as the highest constructive statesman in the development of the Union, next to Washington, Hamilton and Lincoln, to furnish the fairest', most clear-sighted
and discerning estimate of the talents and contribution of Justice Johnson. Joseph P. Cotton, Jr., in his work on The Constitutional Decisions
of John Marshall, published in I 90 5 just at the threshold of a new
movement in the Supreme Court, was almost-if not entirely-alone
amongst the admirers of Mai-shall to adequately sense the latent force
of the personality and ideas of Johnson on the Marshall-dominated
64

EDWARD S. CoRWIN, JoHN · MARSHALL AND THE CoNSTITUTION

l

15-u6

(1919).
65
Quoted by -SHIRLEY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CAUSES 308, 309 (1879)
from FA'Y's LIFE OF STORY. Johnson himself admitted in Hepburn v. Auld, 5 Cranch
(9 U.S.) 262 at 279 (1809) that he had taken a "peculiar view'' of the subject, indicating Johnson's self-scrutiny and also his willingness to express an independent view.
66 From address of James E. Babb found in 3 DILLON, MARSHALL, LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES 202 (1903).
67
3 id. at 406.
68
2 id. at 263-264.
Bernard Mayo, biographer of Henry Clay, has remarked that with Marshall was
the "young and capable William Johnson of South Carolina." MAYO, HENRY CLAY

301 (1937).
\
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Court. In the very first paragraph of 4is introduction, Cotton, after
referring to the opinions of Marshall, says:
"These opinions were, in form, the opinions of the whole
Court, and in that Court there were at least two other men of great
ability; the first, Story, a man of remarkable legal learning, his
ablest follower; the second, William Johnson, a figure too little
understood and valued, who served almost as long as Marshall
and, alone in that Court, exercised an independent judgment 69 on
constitutional questions, free from Marshall's domination, with a
curious foresight and comprehension of the actual workings of the
system which Marshall created. It is to be remembered, too, that
those cases were argued before Marshall by the ablest group of
counsel that have ever practiced before an American Court, men
great not only as lawyers, but as leaders and statesmen; Adams,
69
Burton J. Hendrick, commenting on the political nature of Jefferson's appointment of Johnson, concludes with a superlative appraisal of Johnson in these words:
"Johnson, Jefferson's Republican choice, turned against his chief on embargo matters,
and displayed a complete independence that furnished a model for future generations."
In HENDRICK, BULWARK OF THE REPUBLIC 195 (1937).
Charles Warren has said of Johnson's stand in the embargo case: ''The episode
forms one of the most striking illustrations of judicial independence in American his- .
tory, and deserves more detailed notice than has hitherto been given to it." From his
excellent chapter entitled "Judge Johnson and The Embargo," I WARREN,· THE
SUPREME CouRT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 316 at 324 (1922); also WARREN,
CoNGREss, THE CoNSTITUTioN, AND THE SUPREME COURT 209 and 211 (1925).
In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 304 at 381 (1816), Justice
Johnson expressed· concern about any assertion of inferiority or dependence of state
tribunals, saying: "I should feel the more hesitation in adopting the opinions which I
express in this case, were I not firmly convinced, that they are practical, and may be
acted upon, without compromitting the harmony of the Union, or bringing humility
upon the state tribunals. God forbid that the judicial power in these states should
ever, for a moment, even in its humblest departments, feel a doubt of its own independence. Whilst adjudicating on a subject which the ·laws of the country assign finally
to the revising power of another tribunal, it can feel no such doubt. An anxiety to do
justice is ever relieved, by the knowledge that what we do is not final between the
parties. And no stnse of dependence can be felt, from the knowledge that the parties,
not the court, may be summoned before another tribunal."
See, by the writer, discussion of Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston, IO Fed. Cas.,
p. 355, No. 5420 (1808) in 42 MICH. L. REv. 803 at 812 (1944) in "Mr. Justice
William Johnson and The Unenviable Dilemma."
Gustavus Myers, usually caustic in his references to Supreme Court Justices, nevertheless said of Johnson: "Of all the men ever sitting in that court, William Johnson,
of South Carolina, appointed in 1804, was one of the few distinguished, on the whole,
for his opposition to certain notorious land decisions." He then proceeded to charge
Johnson with being more allied with the banking interests because Joseph Johnson, his
brother, was president of the Charleston, (S.C.) Branch of the United States Bank.
Myer's latter innuendo is insupportable. MYERS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME CouRT
252, 253 (1918).
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Pinckney, Wirt, Martin, Ogden, Binney, Hopkinson, Taney, Benton, Webster, Clay, and a dozen more. But Marshall's was the
dominating mind, completely overshadowing and pervading the
Court during his whole term of service. He created the American
system of constitutional law, the theory was his, the form and
vigor of the opinions were his, and this body of decision is fairly
his achievement and his service."
Cotton's references to Johnson, though few and brief, earnestly
attempt to understand a man who, he realized, had been much misunderstood and whose talent and judicial capacities he- was willing to
objectively evaluate. He spoke of J0hnson's concurring opinion in
Fletcher v. Peck 70 as "acute" though he disagreed with Johnson's
emphasis on basic principle. 71 Johnson's opinion in Houston v. Moore 72
he characterized as "able." 73 He preferred Johnson's concurring opinion in Gibbons v. 0 gden, 74 which he mistakenly calls a "dissenting
opinion," over that of Marshall, saying: 75
"The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson, in Gibbons
v. 0 gden-one of the most acute opinions of that most able
judge-:-is really more satisfactory than Marshall's. Briefly that
opinion reviews the history of the insufficient government of the
Confederation becaus~ of the lack of pow_er over commerce, which
was the prime cause of the adoption of the constitution, and concludes that the' national power is of necessity the sum of the
powers residing in the states under the Confederation, and as such
necessarily exclusive of any residuum of power in the states,though not inconsistent with the existence of power in the states to
make any laws for the carrying out of local purposes in so far as
70

6 Cranch (10 U.S.) 87 (1810).
Cotton quotes the following sentence from the opinion and then adds this comment: "And Justice Johnson said: 'I do not hesitate to declare that 'a state does not
possess the power of revoking its own grants. But I do it on a general principle, on the
reason and nature of things; a principle which will impose laws evel on the Deity.'
"Such a view, that some such basic principles of society exist which are within the
province of the courts to expound and apply, has often found expression in later opinions
that hark back to these phrases, but they are not the law, and, it would seem, wisely,
and in no case did Marshall base a decision on such a ground." I CoTroN, CoNSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS OF JoHN MARSHALL 232-233 (1905).
Johnson later abandoned any "natural law'' doctrine he may have inclined to
earlier.
72 5 Wheat. (18 U.S.) 1 (1820).
73
2 CoTroN, CoNSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS OF JoHN MARSHALL 388 (1905).
74
9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 (1824).
75 1 CoTroN, CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS OF JoHN MARSHALL, note at p. xxxii
( 1905).
71
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they may affect the objects or means of commerce, provided such
laws do not conflict with the exercise of the national power. That
doctrine-perhaps more exactly stated by Webster in his argument of the case-is the real basis of the decision thirty years later
in Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, which is nominally the law
of the Supreme Court, where it is laid down that the power of
Congress is exclusive only as to objects of national concern."
Cotton thought enough of this "dissenting" opinion to set it out in
full following Marshall's opinion and disapproved of the doctrine laid
down by Marshall because he thought Johnson's opinion as "more
sound." 16
H. Johnson, Holmes and their Styles of Writing
Carson, relying strongly on appraisals of Johnson by Story and
others, has given us this very brief thumbnail sketch of Johnson:
". . . He had a strong mathematical head and considerable
soundness of erudition, reminding Story of Jefferson's AttorneyGeneral, Levi Lincoln, although with 'less of metaphysics and
more of logic.~ His tastes were quiet and unpretentious. His
scholarship was marked, but his opinions vary much in character.
Some of them, as his dissenting opinions in Bollman and Swarthout, and Fletcher and Peck, are strong and able, the latter containing the germ of that spirit of dissatisfaction with the doctrines
of the Dartmouth College case which afterwards became common.
Others are confused and wanting in exactness and precision, and
indicate, as Mr. Shirley has observed, that the writer was unable to
put his opinions on grounds satisfactory to himself. His legal instincts outran his powers of expression." 11
Carson's statement that Johnson's writing was confused is without
. foundation. It is more correct to agree with Cotton that Johnson was
not understood. We have seen that Story thought him "peculiar" and
Marshall gloated over his discomfiture. His fellow citizens of the
South thought him their enemy. And even Jefferson, after the embargo
16
2 id. at 37. Cotton's comment on this case is worthy of·notice at this time when
the commerce clause is being put to the test by discriminatory state action. "But the
doctrine of Gibbon.r !I. 0 gden that the power of Congress over commerce excludes the
possibility of an existence of a concurrent power in the States, even if the power of
Congress has not been exercised, though that doctrine has commanded the nominal adherence of the Court, has not pr9ved an entirely workable doctrine. On the point
Gibbom v. 0 gden did not settle or finally expound the law." (See introduction).
An editorial in LIFE magazine recently recalled the principle which dates from
Alexander Hamilton "that the federal government is responsible for the nation's
economic health." 17 LIFE 34 (Oct. 16, 1944).
11
l CARSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 228 (1892).
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incident, became cool for a time and did not really fully understand
J o,hnson's- candor, ability and integrity until late in life. The voice of
th~ dissenter, especially in the early formative days of democratic government, was not to be easily understood or accepted. That has always
been the fate of those who disagree, partly because those who do not
understand feel threatened by knowledge in others. Even Marshall
was a dissenter to a greater degree than his few dissents indicate. The
mind tends to isolate groups into circles of influence-therefore, we
think of Marshall without thinking of him as the strong dissenter
against that large group of the population who held views opposed to
his, views which he in fact largely suppressed by his domination of the
Supreme Court. One single thing is clear, and that is, that Marshall
enjoyed a majority on the bench whereas Johnson's memory was continually under the heavy pressure of opposing political phjlosophy and
its related jurisprudence which successfully submerged the effect of his
dissidence from the cultural scene for almost a century.
When Johnson was not exact and precise it was because he was aware
of the inexactness of the science he '?las working in. "It is not in the
province of mortals," we find written in one of General Greene's letters set out by Johnson, '~to reduce human events in politics to a
certainty." 78 It was to be expected that Johnson's views should seem
confused. The legal system which came to us from England had never
been put to the test of democratic adaptation under constitutional government. Johnson was the first justice of the Supreme Court to attempt
a realistic evaluation of the common law heritage with a freshness of
psychological approach which is paralleled only by that of Jefferson.
It would be a mistake to belie.ve that Justice Holmes, who knew·constitutional history so well, was not influenced by Johnson's writings.
Most of Johnson's opinions, not unlike those of Holmes, were very
brief, although he wrote a number of long opinions on questions on
which he felt very strongly. He cited few cases--a practice adhered to
by Holmes-but when he was put to the task of distinguishing precedents he did it thoroughly and with analytical insight and devastating
effect. In writing opinions he must have had in mind the problem confronting him in writing his Life of Greene. "It is a matter of no small
difficulty," he wrote in the introductton, "to strike the medium between
giving enough, and not over-loading the work with extraneous matter." 79 ft.nd he must have spoken of himself when he said of Greene,
78 I WILLIAM JOHNSON
79

41.

Id. at p. viii. Also, "What is indispensable shall be presented, but brevity shall
always be consulted." Id. at 28.
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"Swift was among his favourite authors, and he always endeavoured
to imitate the strong, chaste, and lucid style of this author. Nor did he
fail; for he wrote with facility, in the clear and manly style of this
author, from •the earliest time of which any specimens of his correspondence are preserved." so
Because of the clarity of his style and its forcefulness, Johnson
must ·be considered one of the first emir"i.ent literary figures in American
jurisprudence. Few have excelled him in facility of expression, although in keeping with the contemporary tradition of southetn eloquence, he was quite fervid at times. While in many respects the views
of Justice Holmes coincided with those of Johnson, the latter arrived
at them sometimes in different ways, and often more realistically.
This is evident from the fact that while Johnson's style is generally
fluent it lacks that metaphoric finality which was so characteristic of the
writings of Justice Holmes.81
80

Id. at I 5.
There are passages in the writings of Johnson and Holmes which are comparable in thqught and style; and this comparison would include also some of the followers
of Holmes who consciously or unconsciously have modelled after his style of writing.
The following is a typical passage in which Johnson was considering a phase of the
history of the admiralty courts:
''Whatever may have been the barbarous doctrines of antiquity about converting
goods piratically taken into droits of the admiralty, the age has long gone by, since it
gave way to a more rational rule, and the party dispossessed was sustained in his remedy
to reclaim the property as not divested by piratical capture. It is hardly necessary to
quote authority for this doctrine, but it will be found. to have been the rule of justice, as
early as the reports of Croke and Ventris."
The above quotation is from Manro v. Alimeda, IO Wheat. (23 U.S.) 473 at 495
(1825). Sir Peyton Ventris, Justice.of the Common Pleas, in 1701 published his
Reports in two parts, covering the period of 1668-1691. The first part included
"select" cases adjudged in the King's Bench and the second part contained "choice"
cases adjudged in the Common Pleas. A number of admiralty cases arising on prohibition to test jurisdiction are reported, one of which holds that a contract for seamen's
.wages made on land is within the jurisdiction of admiralty.
This style may be compared with Holmes's now famous dissent in Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 at 74, 25 S. Ct. 539 (1905), and especially this sentence: "The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics"; or his
statement in Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 at 609, 23 S. Ct. 168 (1903), where he
declared that no court would declare the law unconstitutional, "even if every member
of it believed that Jeremy Bentham had said the last word on that subject, and had
shown for all time that such laws did more harm than good." And these may be ret by
the side of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's recent comment on state action in Osborn v. Ozlin,
310 U.S. 53 at 62, 60 S. Ct. 758 (1940): "It is equally immaterial that such state
action may run counter to the economic wisdom either of Adam Smith or J. Maynard
Keynes.••."
·
These likenesses may not be summarily characterized as due to conscious imitation;
but are more likely ascribable to the operation of discriminative minds comparably en81
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II
DEVELOPMENT As A ScrnNTIFIC D1ssENTER

A. The Political Scene
The Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, was not only a
rejection of the tyranny of George III but may well be considered as
another of the far-reaching forward steps, in man's struggle against
fear and superstition, leading to the substitution of scientific and realistic thinking for magical belief. -That Johnson was quick to help advance this change is apparent from all of his writings. In his oration
at St. Phillip's Church delivered on July 4, 1812 he reviewed the
discovery of America by Columbus in the face of ignorance and superstition as ushering in a new era. "Europe had long slept," he declaimed, "unconscious of the shackles which superstition and tyranny
had thrown around her; a torrent of religious maniacs had swept over
Asia and Africa; and the propagation of religion, by the sword, had
long been the pretext of bl;ody ambition and designing hypocrisy.
But the time was now approaching when the expansive powers of the
human mind were no longer to be repressed, when the torch qf reason
was to be lifted on the dark designs of tyrants and of hierarchs, and
when man, resuming his long lost rights of action and opinion should
burst his fetters and assert his affinity to the Deity." 82
Johnson's grasp of the dynamic quality of what had taken place was
correct. Bertrand Russel thinks that the American Constitution marked
a step in the winning of "general consent to form a government otherwise than by superstition," since in the United States the problem has
been solved. Great Britain, whose stability, he contends, depends on
the crown, has not yet solved this problem.83 The divine right of kings
dowed by early training and responding in the same way upon events substantially similar though removed in time. There is a decidedly contemporaneous ring in this typical
Johnson sentence: "This court is not called upon to decide whether the words might
not also be correctly applied to an individual interest as well as a joint concern; it is
enough, for the purposes of this action, if they will cover the latter." Drummond v.
Prestman, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 515 at 518 (1827). Or take, for example, his opening words in his concurring opinion in Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. (18 U.S.) I at 33
( 18 20) : "If any right, secured to him under the state constitution, has been violated,
it is not our affair. His complaint before this court must be either that some law, or
some constitutional provision, of the United States, has been violated in this instance;
or he must seek elsewhere for redress. This court can relieve him only upon the supposition, that the state law under which he has been fined, is inconsistent with some
tight secured to him, or secured to the United States, under the constitution."
82 At p. 5.
83
RussELL, PowER 99 (1939).
Sir Henry Maine som~ time earlier had dwelt upon the resistance to the
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still prevails in Britain, which still depends on a dogma of mystical
authority to sustain this institution. This is suggestive, however, of
much broader implications. The American experiment marked the
beginning of the change in emphasis in government from the personalized symbols derived from the family unit, such as king, sovereign,
father or lord, to the more abstr.act symbols related to territory, geography and ideology. Thus, state and nation marked geographical
allegiances without regard to blood ties or a concept of sovereignty
supported by the idea of divine choice as an instrument of tribal and
national continuity. It was the most significant move in the direction
of the dissolution of racial separatisms that the world had ever seen.
The tribe was beginning to pass out as an institution and the modern
state as a melting pot of racialism was coming in. Currently, we have
been confronted with the attempt to regress to tribalism and mysticism.
The blood patterns of assumed family groups which have extended into
"nations" are making a last fight for existence in order to maintain
models of government which are· no longer suited to an interdependent
world without physical boundaries. The American experiment was
away from tribal individuality in the direction of the functional social
group where race and blood yield to humanity and culture in their
breaking down of blood ties by the resort to the fictional extension of groups by the
artifice of kindredship such as adoption. The notion of consanguinity was later diluted
and subordinated to the newer ideas of the territorial constitution of nations and the
formation of states by coalescence. The growth has been step by step in the direction of
a brotherhood of the whole human race under the banner of humanity. MAINE, EARLY
HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS, Am. ed., Leet. 3, pp. 74, 64, 386 (1875).
See also Robert H. Lowie's discussion of the territorial idea amongst primitives in
PRIMITIVE SocIETY 390, 4II, 426, 431 (1920). He finds the existence of a "senti- ·
ment based on local contiguity" amongst the Ifugao, "however faint when compared
with the rival sentiment of blood-relationships" (p. 412). Chapter XII on Government, and Chapter XIV on Justice discuss this subject from various viewpoints, and
should be read in their entirety. See especially the excellent small volume by Lowrn,
THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE (1927) and particularly chapter IV, "The Territorial
Tie" at p. 51.
William Stubbs, discussing the growth of administrative and representative institutions in England in his THE CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, c. XIII, pp.
591, 593 (1897), tells how in the period preceding Magna Charta amalgamation and
national unity fused blood differences between English, Normans, Danes and others.
This was accomplished by union of blood, extinction of legal distinctions, intermarriages, unity and growth of language, military control, and taxation. This commixture
of "race and institutions" was aided also by the territorial idea of royalty and the extension of the king's peace, that is, royal law as a common-law system. Edition of 1897,
c. XIII, pp. 591, 593. The extension of the king's peace accomplished paradoxically
a change from personal to territorial organization.
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broadest meanings. 84 Popular "sovereignty" was further substituting
itself for the political authority which organized religion had exercised
over government. The kinship of blood, property and government was
broken when the Constitution forbade the Congress of the United
States and the states to pass any bill of attainer or grant any title of
nobility. Attainer, that is, corruption of blood and consequent forfeiture
and escheat were the instruments of arbitrary government which so
often considered treason and felony as synonymous with the expression of any opinions which questioned the mystical authority of feudal
lords and kings.
Johnson watched these changes taking place. In one of his earlier
opinions in which he was called upon during the War of I8I2 to assert
the rights of war against the property of a citizen, he saw that the judge
must not merely look backward but also forward. "A new state of
things has occurred-a new character has been assumed by this nation,
which involves it in new relations, and confers on it new rights; which
imposes a new class of obligations on our citizens, and subjects them to
·new penalties." 85 New ideas and attitudes were surging forward for
expression in those days, as they are in our time. Johnson felt himself a
84

FRANZ BoAs, THE MIND OF PRIMITIVE MAN 191 ( 191 1) notes the extension
of the altruistic concept in human relations:
.
"Among primitive man, human life has little value, and is sacrificed on the slightest
provocation. The social group among whose members any altruistic obligations are
binding is exceedingly small; and outside of the group any action that may result in
personal gain is not only permitted but even approved; and from this starting-point we
find an ever-increasing valuation of human life and an extension of the size of the
group among whose members altruistic obligations are binding. The modern relations of
nations show that this evolution has not yet reached its final stage." And further: (p.
207) "We can trace the gradual broadening of the feeling of fellowship during the
advance of civilization. The feeling of fellowship in the horde expands to the feeling
of unity of the tribe, to a recognition of bonds established by a neighborhood or habitat,
and further on to the feeling of fellowship among members of nations. This seems to be
the limit of the ethical concept of fellowship of man which we have reached at the
present time. When we analyze the strong feeling of nationality which is so potent at
the present time, we recognize that it consists largely in the idea of the pre-eminence ·
of that community whose member we happen to be,-in the pre-eminent value of its
language, of its customs, and of its traditions, and in the belief that it is right to preserve its peculiarities and to impose them upon the rest of the world. The feeling of
nationality as here expresi;ed, and the feeling of solidarity of the horde, are of the same
order, although modified by the gradual expansion of the idea of fellqwship; but the
ethical point of view Yl'hich makes it justifiable at the present time to increase the wellbeing of one nation at the cost of another, the tendency to value one's own civilization
as higher than that of the whole rest of mankind, are the same as those ,which prompt
the actions of primitive man, who considers every stranger as an enemy, and who is not
satisfied until the enemy is killed."
85 8 Cranch (12 U.S.) 155 at 160 (1814).
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protagonist of a great movement in history, and he was intentionally
impatient with obscurities, legal or otherwise, which would unduly
suppress the underlying dynamic forces which were seeking expression.
As a historian he found that strong statements and courageous action
had in the past been called for, because the members of society from
earliest times had resisted anything new as a threat to personal inner
security. This he percieved as a mental phenomenon. He realized that
if the call to progress was to have an ear, the bold and outspoken mind
--and not only the fretful one-was to be heard. There had to be,
therefore, a declaration of independence also from the "tyranny of
fashion of opinion" as well as the tyranny of kings. "Can the folly be
named," he asks, "which 4as not, at one time or other, tyrannized over
man, under the auspices of impudent usurpation on the one hand, and
the too slavish deference that governs our actions on the other? How
few dare to act from their own convictions of rectitude, and set at
nought the obligations which have no foundation but in fashion or
popular opinion!" 86 No jurist in American history dwelt so often
and so correctly on the evils of superstition, fear and the phantasies
which the imagination conjures up but which often vanish "before the
sober realities of experience." 87
The era of experiment in social relationships by non-violent method
had consciously begun, and was to have enormous influence in world
history. In his Third Inaugural Address, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, viewing our present times, significantly quoted from George
Washington's First Inaugural Address with these words:
"The destiny of America was proclaimed in words of prophecy
spoken by our first president in his first inaugural in 1789-words
almost directed, it would seem, to this year of I 941 ; 'The preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican
model of government are justly considered ... deeply ... finally,
staked on the experiment intrusted to the hands of the American
people'."
Civilization will ever continue, in the face of opposition, to attempt
to improve its social relationships by experimentation. Much trial and
error will yet be required before ignorance and superstition will be replaced by knowledge and science-without ·which any political remedies
86
2 WILLIAM JoHNSON 417; also "Eminence is the favourite target for its shafts;
for little souls are ever intent to draw down the more elevated to their own miserable
level." I id. at 127.
87
I id. at 214.
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for a lasting peace amongst men will be short lived. Washington, Jefferson and Johnson were not misled and faced the reality of the situation. But succeeding generations were more concerned with specific
forms of political machinery as immutable accomplishments. The great
contribution of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was not merely in his
revision of the prevailing jurisprudence as applied to constitutional
law, but in creating a psychological atmosphere for the legal acceptance
of experiment.
B. Contemporary Writers
When Johnson was admitted to the bar, the American Revolution
had already taken place and the French Revolution had already begµn.
Dr. Erasmus Darwin, grandfather of Charles Darwin, published his
Zoonomia in England in 1792-1794. In this work, amongst other
scientific accomplishments, he advanced the theory of evolution which
his grandson, Charles Darwin, later expanded into one of the world's
most significant and stirring scientific contributions. Erasmus Darwin
analyzed pleasure and pain, and their dynamic functions, and developed
a theory about the working of the human mind and the emotions. In
1798 Darwin's widely read scientific poem, The Botanic Garden,88
modeled after the style of Lucretius, appeared in America. In this, our
day of the airplane, the following remarkable prediction would indicate
the extent to which the imaginations of fertile minds were then preoccupied with scientific experiments and speculations:
"Soon shall thy arm, Unconquer'd Steam! afar
Drag the slow barge, or drive the rapid car;
Or on wide-waving wings expanded bear
The flying-chariot through the fields of air.
-Fair crews triumphant, leaning from above,
Shall wave their fluttering kerchiefs as they move;
Or warrior-bands alarm the gaping crowd,
And armies shrink beneath the shadowy cloud." 89
"Darwinizing" had become a popular expression for scientific speculation and experimentation some years before Charles Darwin was born.
Also, at about the same time, Jeremy Bentham began to think of
jurisprudence and government in terms of pleasure and pain and their
psychological import and these he embodied into his ideas of utility
88 Publication of the poem with philosophical notes in the United States was in
1798 and a second edition appeared in 1807 in New York City. First publication in
England was in I 790.
89 Id. at verses 289-296.
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and the greatest good for the greatest number and enlightened selfinterest. Bentham spoke such phrases as "the scien~e of legi~ative enactment," "legal science," and "the science of society," all of which
were inextricably involved in experimental method. 90 His emphasis
was upon social facts and the realities as against the legalistic concern
with fictions. His notion of the survival of the fittest legal principles
according to the test of utility was not too remote from a 'concept of the
evolution of society. There is much to be found in common between
Johnson's concern with reality, his dislike of legal refinement) his search
for the socially dynamic factors and Bentham's vital attack on existing
common-law theories.
Bentham was preoccupied with the idea that all of the common law
could be included in a code and that he could write such a code. Ac~ordingly, with compulsive persistence, he besieged notable governmental officials in the United States and elsewhere when the Tories of
England rejected his scheme. In October 1811 he addressed a letter to
James Madison as President of the United States to which Madison
replied on May 8, 1816. In July 1814 he addressed a letter to Simon
Snyder, Governor of Pennsylvania, having received a letter of introduction from Albert Gallatin, then minister to London. On May 31,
9

INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LAW 53
continent spoke of "history as the experimental
laboratory of legislation." An excellent discussion of Bentham also may be found here.
See also Graham's rather unsympathetic but concise summary wherein he refers to
Bentham's condemnation of rationalizations. WILLIAM GRAHAM, ENGLISH PoLITICAL
PHILISOPHY FROM HOBBES TO MAINE, Am. ed., 242 ( I 900).
Dr. Franz Alexander in his AGE OF UNREASON 49 (1942) overlooks Bentham's
contribution to a psychological approach to the law and criticizes Bentham for holding
that all motivation was derived more or less from enlightened self interest. He fails to
credit Bentham for his interest in legal realities and his immense contributions to modern civilization. Amongst those listed and considered by C. K. Ogden are his theory
of language and fictions, his contributions to the idea of international law including his
opposition to secret diplomacy and the idea of the foundation of a League of Nations in
the form of a Congress or diet, his insight into the psychology of value, his proposals for
codification and particularly of the confused mass of judge-made law, his work on the
foundations of humanitarianism and public health. To these must be added his realistic
emphasis on the distinction between things sensible and insensible, his interest in all
problems of communication, his symbolic researches, his searching analysis of motivation, and his outstanding efforts to mitigate the cruelties of punishment and particularly capital punishment for minor offenses as well as opposition to other social and
legal abuses. See C. K. Ogden's INTRODUCTION TO JEREMY BENTHAM'S THE THEORY
OF LEGISLATION, p. XI et seq., p. 53 5, n. to p. 428; also Ogden's comment on
Bentham's admiration for America on p. xx1.
See also Professor Samuel Williston's comments on Bentham in LIFE AND LAW 306
(1940).
o J. WALTER JONES, HISTORICAL
( I 940) notes the fact that Fenet on the
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I 8 I 6 Snyder wrote to David M. Randolph of Williamsburg, Virginia,
.on this subject and. eventually Snyder delivered a message as governor on December 5, I 8 I 6 dealing with Bentham's suggestion. In June
I 8 I 7 Bentham addressed a letter to the prospective governors of the
United States and another letter to the citizens of the United States as
the ultimate sovereign. He also wrote to the govern_or of Virginia on
May 30, I 8 I 6 on a system of public instruction to be established for
that state. He also wrote to Governor Plumer of New Hampshire
relative to an offer to the legislature to which the governor replied by
letter dated October 2, I 8 I 7. He was uniformly unsuccessful in his
pleas. After some lapse of time, he made a similar offer to Czar Alexander of Russia whose response was the equivalent of a rejection.
At one time he thought of settling in the' Western Hemisphere and
eventually his works were widely read in some of the South American
communities. Bentham, Ogden reminds us, coined the word "international." Nothing daunted, in 1822 Bentham appealed to all nations
"professing Liberal opinions" to whom he suggested a draft of the
whole body of, the law.01 This profound creative dissenter, who paradoxically was seeking to pattern the world, eventually had an enormous
and valuable influence on the progress of world civilization. Whether
Johnson agreed or not with Bentham's specific theories, he could not
have been unaware of their existence, and public notice;· nor could h~
have been unreceptive to some of Bentham's ideas.
And there was Thomas Paine the author of Common Sense, Rights
of Man and the Age of Reason. Paine also wrote the series of tracts
called the Crisis while serving as a volunteer aide-de-camp of General
Greene. The opening words of the Crisis-"These are the times that
try ,men's souls" became a slogan of the day and have reappeared in
succeeding generation:s as a slogan to encourage men when hope seemed
lost. We find Johnson saying of Greene after peace had come-"A new
obligation now grew out of the high standing which General Greene
had acquired in the eyes of the world; his acquaintance was unbounded,
and among them were innumerable friends, who had fastened upon his
affections in the hour which tries men's souls." 02 Johnson inserted the
italics! Furthermore, Paine had been in the forefront in urging a
Declaration of Independence. The letters of Greene reveal that Greene
91

Jeremy Bentham, "Papers Relative To Codification and Public Instruction; including Correspondence With the Russian Emperor, and·Divers Constituted Authorities
in the American United States" (1817). 4 BENTHAM'S WoRKs, edited by Bowring,
451 et seq. (1843).
92
2 WILLIAM JOHNSON 406.
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began over a year before July 4, 1776 to urge such a declaration. In his
letter to General Ward of June 4, 1775 Greene urges that all forces in
America be put under one commander and then concludes-again Johnson italicizes-"Permit me, then, to recommend from the sincerity of
my heart, ready at all times to bleed in my country's cause, a declaration of independence." 93 He repeats this recommendation in another
letter to Ward dated October 16, 1775.94 And, in his letter to Jacob
Greene dated December 20, 1774, the issues no longer are. matters of
mere persuasion. "We must submit unconditionally, or defend ourselves. The calamities of war are very distressing, but slavery is dreadful. I have no reason to doubt the success of the colonies, when I consider their union, strength, and resources. But we must expect to feel
the common calamities which attend even a successful war. We are now
driven to the necessity of making a declaration of independence. We
can no longer preserve our freedom and continue the connexion with
her. With safety we can appeal to heaven for the necessity, propriety,
and rectitude of such a measure." 95
Of Greene's early labors and education Johnson relates: 96
"The position of the right foot of the anchor-smith at the
forge, is precisely that in which his right foot became permanently fixed, from no other cause tp.an his persevering efforts at this
laborious business. Yet at this very time, he was studying Watt's
Logic, Locke on the Human Understanding, and Ferguson on Civil
Society; and was even attentive to, what is shamefully ,neglected in
most of our learned institutions, writing a good hand, and acquiring a critical knowledge of arithmetic and orthography."
•
It may justifiably be inferred that Johnson was quite familiar with
these writers and certainly with Locke. A discussion of the follies of
the Fwndamental Constitutions of South Carolina, attributed to Locke,
appears in his Life of Greene. 07 Johnson's repeated references in his
opinions to a social compact warrants the conclusion of a thorough
familiarity also with Hobbes and Rousseau. It would be hard to believe
that he was not conversant with the works of Hume, Hartley, Stewart
and Reid, Bentham, Priestly and other stimulating thinkers of the day.
Hume's History of the English People, much underestimated, was the
first attempted psychological history of a people.
93

I
I
95
I
96
I
94

97

I

id. at 36.
id. at 38.
id. at 50.
id. at 13. Greene had studied law.
id. at 225.
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The philosophy of Dr. Thomas Reid, the founder- of the Scottish
school of philosophy, had found its way into the opinion of Justice
Wilson in Chisholm v. Georgia 98 which commented on his "excellent
inquiry into the human mind." About a century before William James,
Dr. Thomas Reid in his Essays on The Active Powers of Man; said: 99
"For conscience in those who have exercised it, is a very pragmatical
faculty, and meddles with every part of our conduct, whether we desire
its counsel or not." Dugald Stewart's Philosophical Essays came out in
America at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and his brilliant
work on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, in which he insisted that
our notions of mind and matter were relative, and in which he urged a
science of the human mind, must also have reached educated Americans.
There were strong movements against technicalities, refinements and
"minute discriminations." Horne Tooke, in England, claiming to have
been made "the miserable victim of-Two Prepositions and a Conjunction" 100 which were made "the abject instrument of his civil extinction," wrote on account of it, Diversions of Purley, a work which
became the foundation of the science of etymology. Johnson in his
writings and opinions showed that he thought much about the doubts
and misuse of language.

C. Interest in Modern Scientific Experimentat~on
Inventors, employing the methods of trial and error and experiment, were creatively challenging the adherence to blind beliefs and the
superstitions which clo~e the door to the scientific understanding of
psychological results. There is a wide gulf of meaning between a
scientific awareness of the need for such workable certainties as may
enable us to attain the most expressive realizations out of life and a
prejudiced adherence to a magical pattern of belief which is grounded
in fear. We have already seen that references to the experiments of the
98

2 Dallas (2 U.S.) 419 at 454 (1793).
REID, EssAYS oN THE ACTIVE PowERS OF MAN 374 (1790). (Italics added.)
"It is impossible to draw a line which shalL be immune from casuistical attack, and
perhaps it is unfortunate that the somewhat arbitrary and pragmatic nature of what
courts do in such cases has been so frequently disguised by a show of deduction." Judge
Learned Hand in Live Poultry Dealers Protective Assn. v. United St!1tes, (C.C.A. 2d,
1924) 4 F. (2d) 840 at 842.
10
°From "Advertisement" to second edition, found in edition of 1860 at p. 38.
See previous reference to Tooke in Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Unenviable Dilemma," 42 MrcH. L. REV. 803 at 814 (1944). Johnson in his dissent in
United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. (16 U.S.) 610 at 637-638 (1818) showed extreme
reluctance about taking life when "men's lives may depend upon a comma, more or
less."
99
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scientific world appeared in Johnson's extra-judicial expressions as
well as in his legal opinions. Jefferson and Johnson alike saw no ineradicable line of cleavage between scientific method in the material as
distinguished from the social world. Johnson was the first of eminent
American jurists who avowedly accepted the lessons of science as applicable to mental processes and, therefore, to jurisprudence----gt a time
when the mind of man was still very much afraid. He revelled in the
"delights of mental improvement" and its "fascinating influence." 101
It was not until some years later that Sir Henry Maine-even then
ahead of his time-childed the masters of abstraction for considering
"the purely mental process" as actually dross.102 Maine began to speak
of the law of mental association.1° 3 But Johnson, following the lead
of Hume and others, had already pointed to the association phenomenon in relation to behavior in his Life of Greene.104 "To those who may
be of opinion that I have written too much, I would remark, that there
is a sacredness in the character of our revolution, that gives importance
to the minutest incident connected with it. Like the fly that has plunged
into the consecrated chalice, its insignificance gives place to a new character, communicated to it by association."
The keen recognition of what was really involved in the American Revolution, namely, the overthrow of the tyranny of superstition
as well as the tyranny of persons, becomes clearer as we study Johnson's
unusual insight. In this respect, he is the first non-political jurist, a
creative thinker of the first order, who really sensed the creative mean-,
ing of the Revolution and saw well enough to be able to put his views
into words and action.
Johnson became a member of the American Philosophical Society
in r8ro and remained a member until his death in i834. It is said that
he wrote frequently for its meetings.105 Jefferson's interest in agriculture and all scientific progress touched kindred scientific interests in
Johnson. He wrote an essay on agriculture entitled Nugae Georgicae106 and delivered it to the Literary and Philosophical Society of
101
102

I

WILLIAM joHNSON IO.

MAINE, EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS, Am. ed., Leet. XII, 361 (1875).
108
I id. at 372.
104
1 WILLIAM JoHNSON, Introduction, p. IX.
105
J. G. deRoulhar Hamilton is the authority for this statement in the biographical sketch of Johnson in IO D1cTioNARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 128 at 129 (1933).
The records of the society do not reveal references to papers presented but it is quite
likely that some papers were not recorded.
_
108
Printed at Charleston ( I 8 I 5). Delivered to the Literary and Philosophical
Society of Charleston on October 14, I 8 I 5. Copy available at Library of Congress.
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Charleston-of which he was senior vice-president at the time--on
October r4, r8r5. He became president of the Horticultural Society .
of Charleston and in r832 read a paper before the society entitled
Memoire on the Strawberry. In Nugae Georgicae he reveals, as elsewhere, his deep interest in experimental science. "Agricultural experiments," he observed, "require time, patience and indefatigable observation. Experiments in other sciences may be made in a few minutes,
but in this they require years." 101 To "real science" he attributed the
development of "the great truths of creation." 108
Like Jefferson he was also deeply interested in invention which is
both the stimulus to and result of experiment. In this same essay he
traced to invention the root of all progress. "Nothing has retarded the
progress of invention and improvement more than the inordinate fear
of ridicule. Little minds, incapable themselves of original and benevolent conceptions, console themselves under, conscious inferiority, by exposing to jest the efforts of those who venture to deviate from their own
useless course of life. And contemptible as such efforts are, few are the
minds, unfortunately, that do not shrink from encountering them." 109
And there must always "be that communication of thought and experiment without which nothing human can advance in improvement." The
critical but conscientious John Quincy Adams paid a high compliment to
Johnson in his Memoirs and also recorded a little incident which reveals the breadth of Johnson's interests. On September 2, r 8 r 8, Adams
notes in his diary: 110
, "At eight o'clock we took the steamboat Connecticut, Captain
Bunker, ·for New Haven. In the boat I met, among our fellowpassengers, Judge William Johnson, of the Supreme Court of the
United States, with his sister and daughter. The heat of the day
was extreme, my thermometer nearly at ninety, and all the morning a fl.at calm. We sat, nevertheless, an hour or two after dinner
at table, conversing upon topics of literature and the arts. Judge
Johnson, I find, is one of the anti-classical despisers of Homer and
Virgil and admirers of Ossian, Falconer, Walter Scott, Lord
107
Id. at p. 14. There was great interest in agriculture at the time. Dr. Erasmus
Darwin in 1800 had publishd a work entitled "Phytologia or the Philosophy of Agriculture and Gardening With the Theory of Draining Morasses and with an Improved
Construction of the Drill Plough." Other works had also appeared.
108
"Often in the course of those revolutions to which all human things are subjected, had science reared her head, and again sunk overwhelmed by barbarism." Oration at St. Phillip's Church, Charleston, 4 ( 18 13).
109

WILLIAM JOHNSON, NUGAE GEORGICAE

110

4

28 (1815).

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, MEMOIRS OF JoHN QuINCY ADAMS

128 (1875).
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Byron, and Southey. He is a very ingenious and learned man, and
defends his opinions with so much earnestness and vigor that I
found it advisable, after some discussion, t<1 waive the subject; and,
left bim philosophizing with another of the passengers upon the
construction of the steamboat and the conflicting pretensions of
Fitch and Fulton."
Adams' comment on Johnson's leaning toward modernity is supported by the following excerpt from Johnson's address delivered at
St. Phillip's Church in I 8 I 3: "Adorned by the pen of Plutarch, or
Thucydides, of Livy, or of Tacitus, a lustre is thrown around the actions
of antiquity, that dazzles and humbles us. But let us not be discouraged; under equal advantages, modern times have exhibited men and
actions which Rome would have boasted of, and Sparta applauded." 111
Johnson put into practical effect his predilection for the new movements in thinking. As a member of the committee chosen to select
books for the South Carolina College· he seems to have exerted his
influence in favor of the modern. In the diary of Edward Hooker on
November 9, r805 the following is recorded: 112
"Saturday Nov. 9th .•. P.M. Walked up to the College about
4 o'clock, and visited the Library with Mr. Hammond. The room
is very spacious, airy and handsome. About 5000 volumes have
been purchased but not more than 3000 have yet arrived. Many
of these have an elegant appearance; but it is thought the selection
was not made very judiciously. It was made by a Committee of
gentlemen in Charleston; of whom Judge Johnson of the Federal
Court was a principal one. There seems to be an undue proportion
of modern works-many of them of the emphemeral class. There
are large piles of periodical works, such as the Gentlemen's Magazine, European Magazine, Annual Register, and others of no
more solid worth than these. Some handsome editions of the
Greek and Latin Classics and translations-A few books written
in the Oriental languages."
Science was in the air and Johnson not only was affected by its
stimulating influence as a cultural avocation but throughout his life he
seldom failed to apply the new method to every branch of jurispru111

William Johnson's oration delivered at St. Phillip's Church, Charleston, 18
(1813). See also his reference to the grea.tness of the American Revolutien at p. 7.
112
Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the year I 897 at
p. 852 (1898). The others on the committee were General Pinkney and Judge De-Saussure. See, "Education in South Carolina," 14 NoRTH AMERICAN. REVI.EW 312
(1822).
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dence and politics. Scientific analysis meant for him unprejudiced
judgment. It was Jefferson's interest in science which drew these two
minds together. Johnson said in praise of Jefferson that, when the
politician retired, " ... the sciences pour forth all their stores. He pervades all nature; he mounts into the firmament; and with the finger
of the mathematician, the geographer, and astronomer, points_ to the
only means in nature, by which science can here be gratified by prescribing to the arts." 113 He praised Jefferson's prescience in foreseeing
the difficulties of preserving the purity of commerce as a calling "which
connects the remotest nations of the earth into one society, diffuses to
all the enjoyment of each, illustrates the triumphs of mind over the
powers of the mighty deep, and sheds the lights of science and religion
into the remotest corners of the world in which man has sought for
subsistence or concealed himself from oppression." 114 He recalled that
at Monticello Jefferson revelled in the scenes of agricultural and scientific experiment "where curiosity and science were made the ministering
handmaids to the go~d of mankind." 116 The "time was now approaching, when the expansive powers of the human mind were no longer to
be repressed." 116
Both Marshall and Johnson were at work, in those early days, with
the raw materials out of which a democracy was to be made workable.
Both were engaged in experiment and had to resolve against the ponderous weight and pressure of English tradition and its leaning toward,
precedent, stare decisus, natural law and a conception of the judicial
113
From a eulogy pronounced at Charleston on August 3, 1826 in memory
of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson and found in SELECTION OF EULOGIES PRONOUNCED IN THE SEVERAL STATES IN HONOR OF joHN ADAMS AND THOMAS JEFFERSON 308 (1826). Johnson also approved of Jefferson's conception of universal and impartial benevolence "recognizing all governments as equal-all mankind as the common
care of benevolent governments." Id. at 3 I 7.
114
Id. at 322. Greene wrote to Governor Ward on June 4, 1775: "You stand
the representative, not of America only, but of the whole world; the friends of liberty,
and the supporters of the rights of human nature." I WILLIAM JoHNSON 37.
115
Id. at 325. In the same essay Johnson expressed hope that history would do
impartial justice to Jefferson. He hoped for a calm, candid discussion "when the angry
passions of man will be allayed; the judgment unwarped by excitement and prejudice;
the heart no longer swelling with hatred, disappointment and revenge; nor the mind
carried away by the reciprocal imputations of unworthy motives; when the tendency
of opinions and measures shall be examined by the test of reason and experience; in
minds resolved on deciding with impartial justice. Posterity is never unjust, and seldom decides erroneously. But posterity must be informed and reasoned with and
rescued from those deceptions which are practiced even on posterity" (p. 309). This is,
indeed, a scientific approach to the study of history rather in advance of its time!
116 From William Johnson's Oration at St. Phillips Church, Charleston, 5 (1813).
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function that was highly subjective. The problems, of course, were new
and difficult.117 Marshall was not only a dissenter then; but today,
despite his position as a heroic figure in our history, some of his most
important views concerning federal power are finding many opponents
who tend to rationalize away his great work of consolidation.
Marshall, however, thought of constitutional law mainly as presenting a subjective problem of exercise of pqwer by general principles
rather than an opportunity to unfold the dynamics of legal science.
Beveridge has characterized the chief justice as "a theorist-one of the
greatest theorists America has produced." 118 Justice Story spoke of him
117 "Let it be remembered, that, when Chief Justice Marshall first took his seat
on the Bench, scarcely more than two or three questions of constitutional law had ever
engaged the attention of the Supreme Court. As a science, constitutional law was then
confessedly new; and that portion of it, in an especial manner, which may be subjected
to judicial scrutiny, had been explored by few minds, even in the most general forms of
inquiry. Let it be remembered, that in the course of his judicial life, numerous questions of a practical nature, and involving interests of vast magnitude, have been constantly before the Court, where there was neither guide, nor authority; but all was to
be wrought out by general principles. Let it be remembered, that texts, which scarcely
cover the breadth of a finger, have been since interpreted, explained, limited, and adjusted by judicial commentaries, which are now expanded into volumes. Let it be remembered, that the highest learning, genius, and eloquence of the bar, have been
employed to raise doubts, and fortify objections; that State sovereignties have stood
impeached in their legislation; and rights of the most momentous nature have been
suspended upon the issue: that, under such circumstances, the infirmities of false reasoning, the glosses of popular appeal, the scattered fire of irregular and inconclusive assertion, and the want of comprehensive powers of analysis, had no chance to escape the
instant detection of the profession;-Let these things (I say) be remembered; and
who does not at once perceive that the task of expounding the Constitution, under such
circumstances, required almost superhuman abilities? It demanded a mind, in which
vast reaches of thought should be combined with patience of investigation, sobriety of
judgment, fearlessness of consequences, and mastery of the principles of interpretation,
to an extent rarely belonging to the most gifted of our race." From JUSTICE JOSEPH
STORY, DISCOURSE UPON THE LIFE, CHARACTER AND SERVICES OF THE HONORABLE
JOHN MARSHALL 71-72 (1835).
118
4 BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF MARSHALL 394 (1916). Compare, however, William
Draper Lewis in the following statements which are irreconcilable with each other and
with Beveridge. "Simple in the best sense of the word, his intellectual processes were so
clear that he never doubted the correctness of the conclusion to which they led him.
Apparently from his own point of view, he merely indicated the question at issue, and
the inexorable rules of logic did the- rest .... In the proper, though not in the historical,
sense he was the strictest of strict constructionists, and as a result his opinions are practically devoid of theories of government, sovereignty and the rights of man." ,Lewis then
cites United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch (6 U.S.) 358 (1805) to illustrate Marshall's
"afloidance of all theory." (Italics added). 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 14th ed.,
969, article on John Marshall cited in note 53. It is obvious that such contrarieties
cannot be resolved by methods of psychological intraversion but must be approached
scientifically with the aid of the most objective scientific data in regard to the processes
of thought.
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as "the very oracle of the law," a characterization which would hardly
apply to Johnson, who more often adverted upon judicial _fallibility
rather than judicial omnipotence. Johnson, on the oth~r hand, pleaded
for a frank recognition of the practical problems of government. Marshall strove to apply the idea of subordination in government and employed legal logic to achieve that end. But Johnson championed the
idea that legal logic must work hand in hand with experience. Law was
to him a part of the larger science of society. Experiment was the
method in the physical sciences. So must it be in the social sciences.
Marshall acknowledged the influence of Alexander Pope upon his
early thought. He transcribed Pope's Essay on Man, with some of his
moral essays, at the age of twelve. Burton J. Hendrick has given. us
some insight into Marshall's early life by pointing out the frequent
appearance in the essay of the capitalized words ORDER and REASON and SuBoRDINATION.119 In. his brief autobiographical sketch
Marshall reveals the extent to which he was himself seeking order in
his own life by seeking it externally when he says: "The questions too,
which were perpetually recurring in the state legislatures, and which
brought annually into doubt principles which I thought most sound,
which proved that everything was aftoa!, and that we had no safe. anchorage ground, gave a high value in my estimation to that article in
the 'constitution which imposes restrictions on the states." 120 • Marshall
believed in the protection of the smaller by the larger-"power, war,
conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the
world; and which can never be controverted by those on whom they
descend." 121 This notion, which conformed with his psychological pattern, he fortified by reference to Vattel.122 It was derived from a
rationalization of the protection of tributary and feudatory states w]:io
were assumed to continue as sovereign states so long as self-government exists and authorities are left in the administration of state. The
idea of a "sovereignty" dominated by another is an antinomy. Its incongruities in the future will be dealt with mote and more by psychodynamics and less by politics.
Samuel Johnson, in England, was also a firm believer in the principle of subordination, a favorite subject, which he applied with great
venom and sadisti~ rage against the American colonies. "Sire," he said
119

HENDRICK, BULWARK OF THE REPUBLIC 166-167 (1937).
AuTo~roGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF JoHN MARSHALL, edited by John
Stokes Adams, IO (1937).
121
Opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Peters (31 U.S.) 515 at 543 (1832).
122
Id. at 561.
12
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in I 869, "they are a race of convicts, and ought to be thankful for anything we allow them short of hanging"; and at another time, "I am
willing to love all mankind, except an American." He called them
"rascals, robbers, and pirates,". and exclaimed that he would "burn
and destroy them." At another time he said to Boswell-"! am a
friend of subordination as most conducive to the happiness of society." 123
It was fortunate for democracy that in America the colonists encountered that type of primitive society which emphasized individualism as distinguished from the collective societies of most primitive
peoples. This was a remarkably significant accident of history! In his
Conspiracy of Pontiac 1 2 Francis Parkman pictures in a few words the
well-nigh anarchial character of the American Indian:
4,

"In an Indian community, each man is his own master. He
abhors restraint, and owns no other authority than his own capricious will; yet this wild notion of liberty is not inconsistent with
certain gradations of rank and influence. . . . The •office of the
sachem is not an enviable one. He has neither laws to administer
nor power to enforce his commands. His counsellors are the inferior chiefs and principal men, of the tribe; and he never sets
himself in opposition to the popular will, which is the sovereign
power of these savage democr~cies. His province is to advise, and
not to dictate; but, should he be a man of energy, talent, and address, and especially should he be supported by numerous relatives
and friends, he may often acquire no small measure of respect and
power."
Indeed, as Parkman points out, the Indians did not have a word for
subordination, just as Montesquieu had pointed out that tyrants did
not have a word for "honor." "Subjection and sovereignty are ideas
which never enter into the mind of an Indian, and therefore, his language has no words to express them." 125
128
BosWELL's LIFE OF JoHNSON, edited by Croker, (1853). The reference to the
American colonies is found on p. 435. Croker apologizes for the remark as second-hand
and also as a conversati~nal sarcasm. However, the remark is in line with Johnson's attitude toward America which was violating his firmest principle, subordination. Boo.
well elsewhere speaks of Johnson's "violent prejudice" against America at p. 562.
The second quotation is found on p. 138.
Other references are available in the index under the headings "subordination"
and "America."
1u I FRANCIS PARKMAN, CoNSPIRAcY OF Pcn,TIAc 4 (1910).
125
2 id. at 197.
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"With relatively few exceptions American [Indian] Society was
organized on a democratic basis." 126 The influence of this atmosphere
on American culture has been little dwelt upon. Justice Johnson
studied the customs of the Indians finding "the opinions and customs
of the savage of North America, not differing very widely from those
of the highly civilized Roman." 121 The study of the fusion of the
psychological concept of subordination and feudalism with the Indian's
virulent individualism would· furnish ample reward for the anthropologist and for one who is interested in the psychodynamic origins of
institutions. The student of jurisprudence cannot exclude such an interest.
Some have discovered a "revolution" in the Supreme Court which
began with the dissents of Holmes at about the beginning of the century. First there was dissent, then there came dissent from the views
of the dissenters, so that now some of the early dissenters are called
"conservatives." ';['his indifferent terminology shows how inadequately
such characterizations describe what has taken place. But the poverty of
our expression often reflects a poverty of conception. Society cannot be
concerned alone with who is a left-winger or who is a right-winger,
because both of these fly on but one wing. One's highly personalized
feeling of unrest or peace, as the case may be, may not be conducive to
the correct solution of a grave social problem.
Mr. Justice Jackson has recently well said, "Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity
of the graveyard." 128 Yet the function of dissent cannot be mere disagreement or avoidance or the release of aggressive feelings per se
without regard to the reality of the situation considered. Judicial dissent-indeed all dissent-must aim to· be creative dissent based upon
competence. While it is true that our judges must function in their
offices and perform their commissions, it is well that we know that we
are dealing only with the best judgment available at the moment in
those whom we have elected or appointed. If the dissent is the expression of a highly subjective impulse or prejudice it may have some
value, but the value derived will be largely accidental. There is a distinction of psychodynamic import-too serious to be overlooked by
126 RoBERT H. Lo,VRIE, PRIMITIVE SocrnTY 220 (1920); see also pp. 210, 339,
351 and 383.
127
2 WILLIAM JOHNSON, App. 512.
128 West Virginia State Board v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at p. 641, 63 S. Ct. II 78
(1943).
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jurists-between the inarticulate discharge of emotion through the
medium of aggression, whether judicial or otherwise, and the creative
expression of opinion in a free democracy. Dissent is a resort to the
particular when the general seeks to subdue the dissenter-hence, it
becomes synonymous with individuality, liberty, independence but not
anarchy or insensate prejudice. Therefore, dissent is democracy's most
valuable instrument when creatively us_ed; but it can easily become the
instrument of cruelty, destruction, intolerance and persecution. We, as
civilized humans, have no alternative than to pay more and more attention to the psychodynamic origins of dissent.
As we look back to the life of the little-known, but, nevertheless
capable, figure of Justice Johnson at the very beginning of our constitutional history, we are led to conclude that it is not a revolution which
has taken place in the Supreme Court but rather a return to a consideration of factors in society which had been repressed for more than a
century. This so-called "revolution" was latent in the very nature of
our people, our situation and government. What strikes the analytical
historian as so amazing is how much was accomplished with so little
preparation for the emotional change which was to take place. "Liberty," once said Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes, "is often a heavy burden
on a man. It involves that necessity for perpetual choice which is the
kind of heavy labor men have always dreaded." Johnson, hims_elf,
found the emotional strain great arid on occasions-to use his own
phrase-had to resort to Ithuriel's spear.129
Johnson did not fail entirely-nor was his failure his fault. The
overwhelming opposition springing from the tradition of introspective
jurisprudence, which had but recently only partly emerged from the
superstitious belief in witchcraft and demonology, was a dominating
force with those who were unable to modify their early training.
Blackstone's Commentaries which were widely read in the colonies did
not repudiate superstition or witchcraft and Blackstone seemed to accept
129
There has, as yet, been no study of aggressive behavior as manifested in judicial
action. A mention appears in the unusually far-seeing work of the Yale University Institute of Human Relations, FRUSTRATION AND AGGRESSION (1939) by John Dollard
et al, where it is said at p. I 59: "The Supreme Court is stern when it regulates competition in terms of the Bill of Rights or especially through what is called euphemistically
'due process of law'; criminal action is brought against individuals who better their
status or express aggression by becoming delinquents or criminals; a man is accused of
disobeying the dictum of 'fair play' when he deviates from the cultural norm either on
the athletic field or in business. Some of these taboos in a democracy are clearly formulated, others are rather vague and elastic in their application."
·
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without criticism this phase of legal history. Events were not yet ready,
when Johnson became a Supreme Court justice, for the easy acceptance
of a complete reversal in mental attitudes. Johnson consoled himself
with the thought that "popularity" was "the bane of independence and
truth." 180 He never sought it; nor did he attain it.
Johnson was not only the first dissenter on the American constitutional scene, he was the first creative, the first scientific dissenter.
uo I
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